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ON COMMON LAW MENS REA
GERHARD 0. W. MUELLER*
PREFACE: Lambert v,. California: THE IssuE
One hundred years of American complacency in matters of
mens rea, only briefly interrupted by the forward-looking decision
in Morissette v. United States,1 have come to an end with the
otherwise insignificant case of Lambert v. California.2 The sub-
ject matter regulated by the ordinance under which the conviction
had been rendered in that case could have been any of thousands
which are subject to regulation, the offensive ordinance or statute
could have come from any jurisdiction,3 anyone might have been
the defendant.
Mrs. Virginia Lambert had been accosted by municipal police
officers on a street corner in the city of Los Angeles, searched on
the spot, apparently for narcotics, handcuffed, shoved into a patrol
car and hauled to the precinct station. Further search of her person,
as well as questioning, revealed no evidence of any narcotics viola-
tion. However, the police did discover that Mrs. Lamber had once
been convicted of forgery and that she had not registered with the
chief of police, as required by a city ordinance.4
Mrs. Lambert had been unaware of the existence of this ordi-
nance. By its own terms the ordinance did not provide for notice
to affected parties like Mrs. Lambert, and in fact it was all but
conceded that there was no reasonably conceivable way for Mrs.
Lambert to learn of her duty to register. "A typical absolute
liability offense," everyone might have said and left it at that. Mrs.
Lambert was convicted. Her offer to prove ignorance was denied,
and the conviction sustained.
*Associate Professor of Law, West Virginia University; Senior Fellow
on the faculty of the Yale Law School.
1. 342 U.S. 246 (1952), opinion by Mr. Justice Jackson, ending the
spreading development of criminal liability without fault and limiting it to
offenses roughly corresponding to the antiquated category of mala prohibita.
Morissette had been charged with a federal offense.
2. 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
3. E.g., United States v. Eramdjian, 155 F. Supp. 914, 924 (S.D. Calif.
1957), upholding a federal registration act similar to that declared uncon-
stitutional in Lambert v. California.
4. "The Los Angeles Ordinance makes it a crime for a 'convicted per-
son' to be or remain in the city for more than five days without registering
with the Chief of Police. § 52.39." "A 'convicted person' is comprehensively
defined by § 52.38 of the Los Angeles Municipal Code to include anyone who
has been convicted any place in the world since 1921 of any crime punishable
as a felony or of certain other crimes." "Section 11.00 (m) of the Los Angeles
Municipal Code provides that failure to comply with any of the mandatory
requirements of the code is punishable by a fine of not more than $500, or by
imprisonment in the city jail for not more than sb: months, or both. Each
day's violation is a separate offense." Brief for W. M. Christopher as
Amicus Curiae, p. 8, Lambert v. California.
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On appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States on due
process grounds, a moral issue presented itself: Will this libertine
democracy of ours continue to permit the conviction of persons who
justifiably had no notion of wrong-doing when they conducted them-
selves in violation of law? That convictions of this sort are common-
place under our law is well known and needs no reiteration. That,
from a moral point of view, such convictions cannot be condoned is
likewise apparent to all but those lacking any moral constitution
whatsoever. But our courts do not decide moral questions, unless
they appear as legal issues. Amicus curiae phrased the moral ques-
tion neatly in terms of law: "Does conviction under the ordinance
in the absence of wrongful intent violate due process of law?"
5
Obviously, the Attorney General for the State of California had
to argue that "due process does not require that wrongful intent
be an essential element of criminal legislation enacted under the
police power for the protection of the public welfare and morals."
The argument was simple enough: due process does not require
mens rea; the ordinance, by its terms, made mens rea immaterial;
therefore, the question of appellant's scienter or awareness of
wrong-doing was completely irrelevant and all evidence pertaining
to her well-nigh conceded 7 ignorance had been properly excluded.
A provision of the California Penal Code specifies:
In every crime or public offense there must exist a union, or
joint operation of act and intent, or criminal negligence.8
The Attorney General for the State of California tried to avoid the
impact of the statute by arguing that "the 'intent' referred to ... is
merely an intention to do the act which is in fact unlawful; it is
irrelevant whether the doer knows he is acting unlawfully."'
What of "intent" as contrasted with "evil intent," or the brain
activity resulting in physical motion or rest as contrasted with
"mens rea," whatever that may mean? What of the moral issue of
punishing those who were non-culpably unaware of wrong-doing?
And of the utilitarian aspects of reforming or deterring those whose
mind was neither bent on mischief nor chargeable with dereliction of
duty? This is the jungle of mens rea which the courts have been
only too eager to bypass in the past. Counsel for appellant must
5. Id. at p. 2, evidently referring to the deprivation of liberty (in case
of imprisonment) or property (in case of fine), under the 14th Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution.
6. Brief for Attorney General of the State of California as Respondent,
p. 7, Lambert v. California.
7. Id. at pp. 7-8.
8. Cal. Pen. Code Ann. § 20 (West 1954).
9. Brief for Attorney General of the State of California as Respondent,
p. 8, Lambert v. California.
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have asked himself: would a majority of the court be bold enough
to enter the jungle and to clear it up? On the other hand, if we
regard it as an ethical truism that punishment of those who did not
and could not have any awareness of wrong-doing is immoral, why
should the court refuse to grant relief by placing the legal standard
on the moral level? Yet, one hundred years of history show us
that our courts have often delighted in being immoral in this matter.
Can one hundred years of history be erased? If so, how should it be
done?
I. WHAT IS MENS REA?
In the field of criminal law no question occupies today's scholars,
reformers and legislators as much as that of the mental element of
crime, mens rea. The interest is world wide. The American Law
Institute expends considerable effort on it for purposes of the
Model Penal Code.'0 The Round Table on Criminal Law of the
Association of American Law Schools has scheduled this topic
for debate in 1958. In the scope of state codifications the topic is
commanding more than ordinary interest." In Britain a new look is
being cast on the nature of mens rea.12 In western Europe no topic
of the criminal law is more hotly debated.'3 From South America
the impending publication of the most inquisitive study of the topic
10. Model Penal Code § 2.01-.11, (Tent. Draft No. 4 1955) comments
at 119-155; Model Penal Code § 2.07 (Tent. Draft No. 5 1956) ; see ALI
Proceedings 170-207 (1956).11. E.g., Wisconsin: 5 Judiciary Committee Report on the Criminal
Code 19-24, 34-36 (1953), well done, but of limited insight from the doctrinal
point of view. Now Wisconsin Criminal Code, Wis. Stat. § 939.23, 939.43(1955). See Remington, Liability Without Fault Criminal Statutes- Their
Relation to Major Developments in Contdmporary Economic and Social
Policy: Thc Situation in Wisconsin, 1956 Wis. L. Rev. 625. Puerto Rico: See
the preliminary draft by Donnelly, Code of Correction for the Common-
wealth of Puerto Rico-General Part §§ 3(2) (a), (b); 7; 8; 9; 11; 29(1957) an excellent attempt to restore mens rea, but for the rule on violations,
see § 11.
12. Edwards, Mens Rc a In Statutory Offences (1955), which constitutes
volume 8 of the English Studies in Criminal Science. Campbell, The Re-
surgence of Mens Rea, 32 N.Z.L.J. 310 (1956).
13. The extent of the German literature alone has increased so much
since 1945 that even the most informed profess that they can no longer keep
tab on the many run-away ideas on mens rea. For a critical survey of the
literature until 1949 see Kaufmann, Das Inrechtsbewusstsein in Der Schuld-
lehre des Strafrechts (1949). The literature until 1954 has been considered
in Mueller, Mens Rea and the Penal Law Without It-a Study of the
German Penal Law in Comparison to the Anglo-American Penal Law (un-
published thesis in Columbia University Law Library 1955). For subsequent
inclusive discussions see Lange, Der Strafgesetzgeber und die Schuldlehre,
11 Juristenzeitung (1956); Lang-Hinrichsen, Zur Problematik der Lehre
Voil Tatbeslandund Verbotsirrtun, 12 J.R. 184 ([957). The legislative re-
form materials may be found at 2 Materialien zur Strafechtreform (1954).
For a comparative study of mens rea in the principal European legal systems
see Lang-Hinrichsen, Die Schuld- und Irrtuinslehre, in 2.1 Materialien Zur
Strafrechtsreform 381-428 (1954).
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has been announced.1 4 And, even in the Soviet Union, an astonish-
ing ration of printer's ink and paper has been apportioned for
scholarly excursus on the topic.' 5 The reason for this renewed and
heightened interest is, of course, that we simply do not know enough
about this most important of all criminal law concepts, which is
admittedly vital for crime repression. As the sciences penetrate
deeper into the human mind, we lawyers get more and more frus-
trated about the short-cornings of our standards and efforts. The
more we learn scientifically about the human psyche, the more in-
secure we become in the matter of proper alignment of our criminal
law along those newly-won recognitions. But certainly the task is
not insuperable. In fact, we simply must come to grips with the
problem, since everyone will agree that a criminal law, however
well intentioned, which disregards human psyche is as useful for
society as a police force of deaf, dumb, blind and lame, though other-
wise honorable, citizens.
In order to be able to improve what we have in the nature of a
mental element of crime, we must first ascertain what we have. The
accounts of mens rea which we have in the storehouse of our legal
literature are, with few exceptions,' either antiquated, or-never
meant to be accounts as such-superficial for the purpose of account-
ing, or else they leave so much to be desired that they are not very
helpful.
Even the uninitiated should realize that a study of mens rea,
not to mention a reform, is a vastly complex undertaking. I have
no pretensions in this paper of solving all problems or curing all ills.
But this much I do want to ascertain: what is mens rea? Is it a
term of law, of psychology, or of ethics? An attempt must be made
to ascertain how the courts have regarded the mental element of
14. 5 Jimenez De Asua, Tratado De Derecho Penal. See Blau, Einige
Bemerkungen za dent Lehrbuch des Strafrechts von Jintenex de Asua, 66
Zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft 297 (Germany 1954).
15. Raschkowskaja, On the Question of the Degrees of Guilt, Sovetskoe
Gosvdarstve, 58 (Russia Jan., 1955) ; 5 R.I.D. 70 (Germany 1956) ; Tschik-
wadse, On some Questions of Soviet Penal Law, 59 (Russia Sept., 1954) ;
3 R.I.D. 643 (Germany 1954) ; Ssergejewa, On the Question of Individual-
ization. of Penal Responsibility, Sovetskoe Gosvdarstve, 33 (Russia Jan. 1951) ;
1 R.I.D. 6 (Germany 1952) ; and see Kielwein, Die Schuld im sowietrussis-
chen Strafrecht, 1 M.B1. Fachgr. Str. 5 (Germany 1951); Scheuerle, Die
Schuld im sowjet-russischen Strafrecht, 2 M.B1. Fachgr. Str. 54 (Germany
1952).
16. Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law (1947) ; Williams, Crimi-
nal Law- The General Part (1953). These exellent works have influenced
my thinking heavily, though perhaps not as much as they should have. To
give more specific credit to them in this article would be an insuperable task.
Likewise, I do not propose to specifically document every one of my de-
partures from the views held by Hall and Williams, though on certain specially
important issues this was found to be necessary.
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crime by their positive actions and statements. We may then general-
ize our findings and define the resulting concepts. The accuracy
of this concept must then be tested against the supposed exceptions.
Thus, our inquiry is in two parts: I. What is common law mens rea?
II. What exceptions to the common law mens rea requirement did
the common law develop? The emphasis on common law, as opposed
to modem statutory criminal law, is noteworthy, because we can-
not talk intelligently about statutory criminal law until we are sure
about the common law basis on which all Anglo-American statutory
criminal law rests.
A. The Act.
There is no textbook on criminal law which does not begin
with, or early make, the assertion that every crime is composed of
an act' 7 and intent.' 8 By itself such a statement is misleading. For
even in ordinary parlance we do not refer to that which is not the
result of some sort of mental activity, popularly referred to as
intent or voluntariness, as an act. Thus, if I am engaged in the
activity of writing words on paper I do so because I intend to do so,
which is to say that the event of writing would not have resulted
but for my brain's command to my hand to bring about the event.
Thus, intent is not something separate or in addition to the act,
it is rather a part thereof. An act, therefore, is a psycho-physical
17. Onissions are treated as acts, and what will be said about acts
applies with equal vigor to the psycho-physical concept of the omission. The
two concepts frequently have been treated under the common name of conduct
(not behavior I which smacks of greater irrationality than we wish to admit
for the defendant who meets the mental test of the criminal law). Since acts
are far more frequent in the criminal law than omissions, we can, without
sacrificing too much accuracy, continue to refer to arts as including both acts
and omissions, but with the caveat that we always deem the legally relevant
omissions to be covered by our assertions. In other words, from now on we
are talking of the more familiar term act as a synonym of the less familiar
term conduct. J. Hall, with whom I am otherwise in complete agreement on
this point, prefers to refer to acts as "voluntary" conduct. Hall, op. cit. supra
note 16, at 252-78. This I deem unnecessary, since an involuntary act, in the
psychological sense, is more in the nature of a spasm. Act, as I use the term,
includes the notion of voluntariness. Professor Hughes' valuable article on
Criminal Onissions, 67 Yale LJ. 590 (1958), appeared after completion of
this manuscript and could not be fully considered. I am in abundant agree-
ment with Professor Hughes' conclusion that "where inaction is evidently
socially harmful, no good reason appears from shrinking from penal pro-
hibition," and that "nothing inherent in the failure to act ought to mark
if off from positive actions as a proper subject for penal law." Id., at 636. I am
in violent disagreement with Professor Hughes on his proposition that "con-
ventional attitudes to mens rea, particularly with respect to ignorance of
the law, are not adequate tools to achieve justice for those accused of in-
action." Ibid. Nothing in Mr. Hughes' article proves that the considerations
as to mens rea for ommission need be any different from those for commission.
18. E.g., May, Law of Crimes 3 (4th ed., Sears and Weihofen 1938);
Miller, Criminal Law 16 (1934).
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event. But not every psycho-physical event is an act because we
know of human behavior which does not result from any conscious
order of the brain, which is, rather, the result of an unconscious
mental drive, perhaps the result of disease -though not necessarily
so-in any event, of forces emanating from the unconscious mind
over which the individual has no instantaneous control. And though
in common parlance we speak of the act of an insane person, strictly
speaking, what we observe a demented person doing is not an act
at all, it is an event,1 9 though in a purely physical sense, by way of
cause and effect, the result is attributable to the insane person.2 0
The description of an act as a psycho-physical event in which
a perceptible effect has been caused by conscious interaction of the
mind and the functioning body, is regarded by many as old fashioned
and outdated. A more modern answer given, quite frankly, does not
carry us much further for purposes of our search for a definition of
the legally relevant intention. The more modern answer simply
takes into account that it is difficult to ascertain when the mental
element of an act was of a conscious or voluntary nature and when
it was a product of habit, urge, irresistable impulse or irrational
causes, such as disease. Thus, one can say that we can truly talk
of an act, as embodying the element of a conscious functioning of the
mind, only when we can ascertain that the acting individual would
have reacted to various stimuli in various ways, all as common and
ordinary,21 and that his body would not have moved as it did had
he chosen differently. We could lastly define an act, with H. L. A.
Hart, as "a defeasible concept to be defined through exceptions" only,
that is to say, the behavior of a person is no act in all cases in which,
for social reasons we do not wish to attribute an event to the person
who brought it about, in any one of a number of recognized in-
19. Compare Wechsler and Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homi-
cide, 37 Colum. L. Rev. 701, 752 (1937).
20. For a detailed discussion of act, in general accordance with the
views here expressed see Hall, op. cit. =pra note 16 at 252-78. Compare
Perkins, Criminal Law 474-475 (1957), with references to the leading liter-
ature. See also Williams, op. cit. supra note 16, c. 1 (1953).
21. The reference is, in any event, to the mind governed by reason,
which has been defined as "(1) the power to abstract ideas from experience,(2) to relate ideas in propositions, (3) to employ those propositions in syllo-
gisms and (4) to distinguish between the true and the false in the realm of
knowledge." Wechsler and Michael, op. cit. supra note 19, at 1273 n. 32.
Wechsler and Michael add to these criteria (of what we may call the power
to make decisions) "(5) the capacity to distinguish good and evil in the realm
of action and (6) to command the will i.e. to act in accordance with such dis-
criminations." Ibid. I would rather regard the latter two elements as un-
necessary for the power to make decisions, but as necessary for the power
to make moral decisions. This interpretation, of course, does not help us in
ascertaining the interaction of passions ("pattern of . . . sensual desires"),
"habitual" or "sporadic," and "reason".
1048 [Vol. 42:1043
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stances.22 The Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute
operates with this defeasible concept of an act by providing:
The following are not voluntary acts within the meaning of this
section:
(a) a reflex or convulsion;
(b) a bodily movement during unconsciousness [coma?] or
sleep;
(c) conduct during hypnosis or resulting from hypnotic sugges-
tion;
(d) a bodily movement that otherwise is not a product of the
effort or determination of the actor, either conscious or
habitual.23
None of these various ways of defining the concept act can
solve the difficulty inherent in the mental process which brings about
the perceptible bodily movement. In the first place, we do not know
enough about what is going on in the subconscious mind, especially
as to how matter stored in the unconscious mind affects, influences
and overrides orders and decisions emanating from the subcon-
scious. Modern behaviorists are inclined to exaggerate the part
of the unconscious, where earlier scientists exaggerated the part
of the subconscious. But it is unquestionably true, as Robert H.
Gault wrote, that "it is a fair inference that criminal behavior-like
the behavior of men and women in the ordinary course of the day's
work-is not simply a product of innate instincts or dispositions or
reflexes that work as faithfully as a wound clock runs down."'24
For purposes of practical dealings with human beings, especially
in the administration of criminal law, we have to draw certain more
or less arbitrary lines. The choice is dictated not only in a fairly
reasonable accord with our understanding of the human psyche, but
22. Hart, The Ascription of Responsibility and Right, 49 Proc. Arist.
Soc. 171 (1949). But by treating the concept of act, or action, as an ascriptive,
rather than descriptive, term, Hart comes close to making the mistake which
I am trying to avoid here, namely of making the mental ingredient of the
concept act itself the criterion not only of a legally relevant attribution, but
ultimately also of criminal liability.
23. Model Penal Code, § 2.01, comments at 119-123 (Tent. Draft No.
4, 1955). I am particularly troubled with "habitual effort or determination"
as mental process for conduct. But apart from thit, what I said about the
danger of Hart's approach applies here with equa vigor. Subs. (9) of sec.
2.03 provides that knowledge of illegality is not an element of crime. Id. at§ 2.03(9). (This provision was accepted by the ALI without any protest
whatsoever I) Since all the culpability requirements of section 2.02 encom-
pass only the definitional elements of an offense (id. at * 2.02(2)), the element
of unlawfulness excepted, we are left with a mens rea concept which makes
the mental ingredient of the act concept the criterion not only of attribution
but also of liability, i.e., culpability, in many cases, especially those of reg-
ulatory offenses.
24. Gault, Criminology 61 (1932).
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also by social policy considerations. Therefore, while being thrown
into a bed of city owned chrysanthemums is not an "act" by any
standard, because in such a case quite clearly the brain has given
no direction to the body, when it comes to events caused by children
or insane persons, the choice must be somewhat arbitrary. Nobody
would say of the kicking and screaming of a newly born infant that
these events are "acts." But somewhere between birth and man-
hood, and probably at a very early time, we must conceive of events
brought about by the human being as acts. Is it not surprising to
note that the common law of crimes has not drawn such a line at all?
It satisfies itself with a line, drawn at age seven, which marks the
beginning of the power to act morally as distinguished from the
power to act rationally. The former power, because of its dependence
on moral education and habit forming, develops relatively late in
the life of the child. But in any event, in limiting the concept of the
power to act morally the legal rule on infancy necessarily delimits
also the concept of the power to act, since the former is necessarily
included in the latter.2 5 Nobody would question that events brought
about by a youngster of six years and eleven months may not be acts.
But for purposes of the criminal law they are not relevant acts. It is
similar in the case of the insane, except that here the law deals with
both the power to make a rational decision and the power to make
a moral decision in the alternative. We have adopted an arbitrary
standard, that for instance of the man who is mentally so deficient
that he does not know the nature and quality of his act, by reason
of disease of the mind (power to make a rational decision), or,
that, for a like reason of disease of the mind, he did not know that
what he did was wrong (power to make a moral decision) .2 We
then say that anybody who does not meet this standard is incapable
of performing what we wish to regard as an act. Henceforth we are
talking, thus, about acts in a legally relevant sense, because we have
seen that the complexity of the subject forced us to define an act in
a more or less arbitrary manner and for purposes of a social policy.
This much must be remembered, in the sphere of legally relevant
acts we mean by "act" always a psycho-physical event in which a
perceptible effect has been caused by conscious interaction of the
mind and the body, i.e., a mental process - frequently and popularly
referred to as intention or voluntariness-and a physical movement.
25. Compare Wechsler and Michael, op. cit. supra note 19, 1261 at
1287-88; Perkins, op. cit. supra note 20, at 731. The trend toward postponing
the line is noteworthy.
26. M'Naghten's Case 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).
Compare, Hall, op. cit. supra note 16, at 499 with text at note 21, supra.
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B. Confusion of mens rea and intent.
We began with an examination of the assertion that every crime
is composed of an act and intent, and we are now left with the con-
clusion that intent is really part of the act. Is it not inconceivable
that the text writers were unaware of the fact that intent is part of
the act, or did they mean something separate and distinct when they
talked about intent as a requirement for crime in addition to mental
process and physical movement? Hundreds, if not thousands, of
cases decided in our courts over the last hundred years raise some
doubt! We may pick almost any one at random to investigate the
point. United States v. Gris,27 taken, at the time of writing from one
of the latest advance sheets, is as good an example as any. The
defendant was charged with having "wilfully and knowingly" tapped
a telephone wire, in violation of federal law. There was no doubt
that the various physical movements which constituted the tapping
of the wire were accompanied and preceded by a mental process, a
consideration to engage in these physical movements. These move-
ments, thus, were willed and the defendant was conscious or aware
of the willed movement, "he knew." Judge Medina, therefore, con-
cluded that "he knew exactly what he was doing; and what he did
was a violation of the Federal Communications Act. He intended
to do what he did, and that is sufficient." 28 Well then, if the physical
movement with its creative and accompanying mental process is
all that is required for criminal liability, it would seem that the
phrase "every crime consists of act and intent" means no more
than that every outlawed act, consisting of mental process and
physical movement, is a crime without more. 9 But at this point
we must harbor suspicion because, if this statement is true, would
it not follow that D who aimed at a deer, but, hitting a stone from
which the bullet was reflected, killed g fifty yards away, is guilty of
murder? There is then a strong indication that something more
than a mere act is required, something which could perhaps be
rightly ignored in the Gris case, but which should not be ignored in
homicide or perhaps in all common law offenses, especially of a
grave nature. And that is true, because what is really meant when
courts and writers talk about act and inten: of orthodox crimes is,
that a mens rea is required in addition to an act. Bishop expressed
27. 247 F.2d 860 (2d Cir. 1957). But see the commendable decision in
Heikkdnen v. United State, 355 U.S. 273 (1958).
28. 247 F.2d. at 864.
29. Perhaps with the understanding that the legislature may impose a
special requirement of proof that a particularly blameworthy attitude has
been evidenced. This, indeed, is a modem trend in thinking about these
matters. See Mueller, Mens Rea and the Law Without It, 58 W. Va. L. Rev.
34, 67 (1955).
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it spendidly when he said: "There can be no crime, large or small,
without an evil mind. In other words, punishment is the sequence
of wickedness.... It is therefore a principle of our legal system...
that the essence of an offence is the wrongful intent, without which
it cannot exist.' 30 But it is precisely due to the misleading and vague
nature of the act-and-intent rule that a considerable amount of
damage has been done not only to the structure but also to the
efficiency of our criminal law. Statements like that quoted from
United States v. Gris are plainly wrong in light of a proper inter-
pretation of the common law because they ignore the mens rea re-
quirement by confounding it with the mental process ingredient
of act.
C. Robinson's Scheme.
It was a criminal law professor, James J. Robinson, who not
so long ago tried to demonstrate graphically what we mean, or in
any event what he meant, by actus reus and mens rea. This is his
graph :"1
THE ELEMENTS OF A CRME
I. The mental
self-direction
A. The Act and
,I. The physi-
'cal movement
'I. The specific
criminal intent
or
II. The general,
non-specific,
criminal intent
{ 1 Perception2. Deliberation3. Decision4. Execution{ 1. Origin
2. Circumstances
3. Consequences
Specified in the statute;
in the indictment:
1. By a word, such as, willfully,
intentionally, knowingly, malici-
ously, wantonly, recklessly.
2. By a phrase, such as, with pre-
meditated malice, without re-
gard for the safety of others,
(assault and battery) with in-
tent to rob, (obtaining proper-
ty) with intent to defraud.
May be indicated in the statute;
in the indictment: at times by the
word unlawfully.
30. I Bishop, Criminal Law 192-93 (9th ed., Zane and Zollman 1923)
(emphasis added.)
31. Robinson, Criminal Law and Procedure 424 (1941). My summary
presentation of the "Principles of Anglo-American Criminal Liability," in
Mens Rea and the Corporation, 19 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 21, 36-38 (1957), oper-
ates with Robinson's scheme. In the instant paper I am not only attempting
to go into greater detail, but also to bring Robinson's scheme into better
accord with an analytical examination and recognition of the concepts actus
reus and mens rea.
The
Crime
B. The
Criminal
Intent
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This is a most helpful chart and we may well employ it as a start-
ing point for further inquiry. On his chart Robinson makes it imme-
diately clear that what is commonly called the "act" is really
composed of a mental process, which he rather awkwardly called
"mental self-direction," and its outwardly visible counterpart, the
"physical movement." This psycho-physical phenomenon "act" is
then contrasted with what he calls the "criminal intent." This
scheme is correct, but the method is somewhat inaccurate. To call
this mental element of crime merely "criminal intent" renders it
subject to being confused with the "mental self-direction" which is
also frequently and popularly referred to as "intent." Merely to
add the word criminal to the word intent (in the sense of mental
elements of crime) will not do because it could be argued that it is
criminal only because the law happened to call it such, which still
leaves it subject to being confused with the "mental self-direction."
Robinson should have called the mental element of crime by its
commonly accepted name, "mens rea," not only because that saves it
from being confused with his "mental self-direction," but also
because it is more inclusive, covering such frames of mind as
criminal recklessness, which the word "intent" does not seem to
cover.
In accordance with accepted standards, Robinson should then
have called "the act" actus reus (evil act), not only because it is
the counterpart of mens rea (evil mind), but also because this makes
it quite clear that we are not concerned with just any act, but with
a legally relevant act. Actus reus connotes an outlawed act which fits
a penal norm and is presumptively the product of an evil mind,
according to the common sense principle-subject to rebuttal-that
everybody is presumed to have intended what he did.
Next, rather than to call the psychic ingredient "mental self-
direction," I would call it "mental process." For its components
Robinson used descriptive terminology.8 2 This can well be done.
But if so, we should make it clear what we mean by these terms.
Perception is the sensual receiving of impressions through the con-
scious mind, and sent for storage to the unconscious mind, but also
used for immediate decision within the subconscious mind. Each
decision is, of course, also influenced by instincts and memories
which constantly flow from the unconscious mind to the subcon-
scious mind. This is the thought and execution process. But all that
is necessary for purposes of determining whether or not an act has
been constituted is to say, with all the cautions expressed before,
32. Robinson probably relied on Salmond, Jurisprudence 383 (8th ed.
1930) ; see Perkins, op. cit. mipra note 20, at 471-75.
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that the outward physical movement must be the product of what by
common community standards is regarded as a rational mind, and
that, ordinarily, the mind accompanied the physical movement from
beginning to end .3 Thus, it is perhaps simpler to substitute terms of
a different descriptive nature for Robinson's terms and to say that
the mental process necessary for an act has two aspects, that of
creativeness and that of duration.
The physical movement need not be broken down into further
components, and all Robinson wished to indicate by the terms
"origin" and circumstances," I suppose, is that a physical movement
does not happen in a vacuum, and can be judged only under con-
sideration of its environmental conditions.8 4 The bending of a fore-
finger can be observed as an act, but it would not interest the
lawyer very much by itself. It becomes a legally relevant act only
when the bending of the forefinger occurs in a certain environment,
i.e., when the forefinger touches the trigger of a gun which in turn
causes a shell to explode, a bullet to be ejected from the gun's barrel,
etc.3 5 Here is the fluent boundary between Robinson's concept of
"circumstances and consequences." These consequences have been
subjected to legal rules of causation, again rules of practical choice.
Through these rules of causation we seek to limit the concept of an
act to those consequences which can be deemed to have been con-
33. The latter aspect, which I want to call duration, is subject to case
law rules and exceptions. This may be illustrated by the following example
from the Model Penal Code § 2.01 comments at 120 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955) :
If the driver of an automobile loses consciousness with the result that
he runs over a pedestrian, none of the movements or omissions that ac-
company or follow this loss of consciousness may in themselves give rise
to liability. But a prior voluntary act, such as the act of driving, or a
prior omission, such as failing to stop as he felt illness approaching, may,
under given circumstances, be regarded as sufficiently negligent for liability
to be imposed. In that event, however, liability is based on the entire course
of conduct, including the specific conduct that resulted in the injury.
In this example the mental process resulted in the creation of the legislatively
specified envisaged harm highly likely, or perhaps even inevitable. It does not
matter, therefore, that at the precise moment of impact the offender's mental
process was no longer operative.
34. Williams, op. cit. supra note 16 at 17-19. But quacre whether
Williams does not go too far in suggesting that "Actus reus includes ... also
the absence of any ground of justification or excuse .. ." Id. at 19.
35. Of environmental conditions there are those which are necessarily
inherent in the definition of the act, as made legally relevant by the law
giver, e.g., the fact that the forefinger is in relation to the trigger of the
gun, etc., and those which the law giver imposes specifically. The latter may
be immediately perceptible by the senses, or subject to easy ascertainment,
as in the case of wearing an official uniform or emblem to which the offender
is not entitled, or else, they may not be immediately perceptible by the senses,
though presupposed as knowledge contained in the store house of knowledge
(the unconscious), from which they are readily producible (to the sub-
conscious) and thus become part of the mental process. As an example, we
may think of the condition "war-time"' as one of the actus reus elements in
one form of espionage.
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sidered in the mental process, though we must at once admit that,
since our knowledge of the mental process is too limited, the
approximation between mental process and consequences is rather
rough. Physical movement, then, is limited by environment and
rules of causation.
But it is now necessary to mention a further limitation of our
interest in the physical movement part of the act, equally important
as the limitation of causation. Physical movement interests us only
insofar as a state of affairs has been brought about which coincides
with the legal norm, or, differently stated, the effect of the physical
movement must be a state of affairs which is precisely that which
the law has specified as harmful. The act of bending the forefinger,
shooting, killing, or however narrow or wide one wishes to take the
concept of act-subject to causation-interests us only insofar as
its effect is identical with a state of affairs specified in a penal
form. It is this which we call harm. It may be a physical or imme-
diate harm, perceptible by all, or it may be a mere state of danger
which has been created. But in any event, the harm is the end
point of human activity, as far as the penal law is concerned and we
need not show any interest beyond it.
38
So much about actus reus, 37 and now to Robinson's concept
of "criminal intent" which we already decided to call "mens rea" so
as to properly accommodate negligence etc., and to prevent its con-
fusion with the mental process part of the act. There has crept into
our thinking the idea that there is no singular concept of mens rea
but that, since every crime has a different mens rea requirement, one
should talk of mentes reae rather than mens rea. This is a miscon-
ception and it is false to conclude, as some do,38 that there is no
unifying mens rea concept. Just as all cars have different wheels,
little cars little wheels and big cars big wheels, and we are justified
in referring to them collectively under the unifying concept wheels,
so all crimes have a different mens rea and yet the concept of mens
rea must be regarded as a unifying concept of various possible
frames of mind.
36. For a detailed and excellent discussion of the theory of harm see
Hall, op. cit. supra note 16, at 13-18. Williams dces not include the state of
danger into the harm concept. Williams, op. cit. subra note 16, at 17. He fails
to appreciate that "mischievous tendencies" are, by their very existence, harm-
ful to society. Thus, "mischievous tendencies," when strong enough to be
prohibited by the legislature, are harmful.
37. Robinson's graph shows that actus reus and mens rea are joined
by an "and ;" indicative of the requirement of chronological concurrence of
the two, on which I do not propose to elaborate in this context.
38. Regina v. Tolson, 23 Q.B. 168 (1889) ; Sayre, The Present Signifi-
cation of Mens Rea in Crininal Law, in Harvard Legal Essays 399, 402-03
(1934).
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D. The forms of menw rea.
This concept appears in a number of different forms, which have
not been commonly recognized. Rather, superficial examination has
lead to the classification of mens rea into two basic kinds, which
Robinson accepted, the specific intent and the general, non-specific
intent. This is obviously a very crude method of classification, as a
glance at Robinson's specific instances behind those terms will
show. We cannot detect any legally relevant criteria, especially none
which the courts have followed, distinguishing one group from the
other. Certainly, such words as "intentionally" cannot even in
common parlance be regarded as specific in any respect, particularly
so since judges constantly take them for no more than the mental
process part of an act, which is, of course, a completely false inter-
pretation. Moreover, even the superficial observer will wonder how
such terms as "maliciously" and "recklessly" can be placed on the
same plane. A particular incongruity is the inclusion of "without
regard to the safety of others," a form of mens rea clearly below
any intention to produce the harm, into the category of specific
intent. And lastly, if the non-specific intent may be specially indi-
cated in the statutes (e.g., by the word "unlawfully") what makes
it so non-specific? Thus, the partition of mens rea into specific
intent and general intent is both unworkable and meaningless.
Indeed a much simpler way suggests itself for classifying the
various appearances of the complex concept of mens rea into work-
able subdivisions. When we study the mens rea requirements of
various common law offenses, we perceive at once that mens rea
appears in various forms:
1. Commensurate mens rea.
The most easily recognizable, and perhaps even commonest,
form is that of an evil intent to do precisely that which constitutes
the prohibited harm. As an example we may take what in many
states has become the standard form of homicide, murder in the
second degree,39 which is the killing of a human being (actus reus)
with the completely commensurate mens rea form, the intention to
39. Homicide in the second degree is usually presumed from the act of
killing a human being. The prosecutor will have to prove additional mens rea
requirements to raise the crime to murder in the first degree, the defendant
can negate the presumption of the existence of second degree murder mens
rea by showing that he had less mens rea (or none at all) than that required
for murder in the second degree. E.g., W. Va. Code Ann. § 5916 (1955), and
comments at p. 2722.
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kill a human being.40 Larcency may serve us as another example:
it is the taking and carrying away of the gcods of another (actus
reus) with precisely the intention to do so.4' We can say in these
cases that the mens rea is commensurate with the actus reus, and
for want of a better term, we can call this form of mens rea the
commensurate mens rea.
Excursus: mens rea and ethical evaluation. The substance
of mens rea.
At this point I am likely to be charged with incongruity and the
charge may appear so severe that, before proceeding to the discus-
sion of the remaining forms of mens rea, an explanation is called for.
Why is it necessary to speak of a mens rea, in the form of
intention (e.g., to kill), if we decided that the mental process which
is part of the act, actus reus, already amounts to, or includes, some-
thing of the same nature, an order to the extremities to do that
which amounts to an accomplishment of killing? It will be recalled
that our mental process was completely valueless on the ethical scale.
We made no statement as to whether or not the mental process was
good or bad in itself, whether we would attribute liability or not.
We say "he did," because he decided to do and knew what he was
doing. But the concept of mens ra is completely different from this
ethically indifferent and valueless mental process and this is com-
monly not recognized.4 2
The term mens rea which the common law has employed at least
since the days of Coke,43 is Latin and means evil mind. It has
a decidedly moral or ethical sound, as in French law, where it is
40. It will be noticed that I used the more modern phrase intention to
kill, rather than the well-known common law phrase .nalice aforethought. Since
aforethought has been held over and over again to ba without any significance,
we are left, even at common law, with the term iralice. But the cases show
that malice has a connotation which is no different than that of an intention
to kill, allowing for certain substitute frames of mind which, from experience
and probability considerations, and for purposes of utility and social need,
are being deemed equivalent to an actual intention to kill. Considerations of
this nature have been discussed in Wechsler and Michael, op. cit. supra note
16, at 733-51.
41. In jurisdictions where the element of lucri causa is required (there
may well be none left), larceny would no longer be in the same category, but,
rather, would move to our second category.
42. Perkins represents the more popular view which fails to make a
clear distinction between mental process and mens rea. Perkins, op. cit. supra
note 20, at 654-61 passin. By defining mens rea as "either intention to do the
act or bring about the consequence or (in some crimes) recklessness as to that
consequence," and failure to define the substance of mens rea, Glanville
Williams reaches the same faulty conclusion as Perkins, although, since he
differentiates clearly between mental element in act and mens rea, by a
different route than Perkins. Williams, op. cit. supra note 16, at 29.
43. See Note, The Doctrine of Mens Rea, 13 Crim. L. Mag. 831 (1891).
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called l'element morale, and in German law, where the ethically
flavorless form of Vorsatz (intention) and the form of Fahrlsig-
keit (negligence)- which latter, of course, imports a notion of
blame ipso facto-have a common denominator of ethical implica-
tion, Schuld (guilt). It would appear that by employing an ethico-
legal term as a common denominator for the various possible
forms of mental elements in crime, our law has committed itself
to an ethical concept of crime.44 That appears to be true at first
glance-though the complete veracity of this conclusion is precisely
the issue of the second part of this paper-when we are asked to
name, without hesitation, a common law offense which is or was not
part of the moral code of the time of its validity.45 We are em-
barrassed by such a question, since we cannot think of instances
of this nature. That this coincidence of the moral, ethical, and legal
holds no longer true today is commonly known, though the reasons
therefore are generally not so well known. In any event, at common
law there was and is an ethico-legal concept of mens rea, because
every prohibited act was also known to be evil. Thus, an intention
to do this act amounted to an evil intention, a mens rea. To bo quite
sure, the common law itself did not particularly care whether or not
people acted morally or not-though there were important excep-
tions, especially among the colonial New England Puritans-but it
used the test of morals, mores or conventions, as criteria for impos-
ing legal blame since the prohibitions were much better known in
their moral than in their legal garb. ( It must be noted, though, that
from this sphere of the immoral only the most flagrant instances
were selected for treatment by criminal law.) The maxim error
juris criminalis nocet4" could do no harm at such a time, because
what was legally punished was also morally unacceptable and
nothing which was morally acceptable was legally punished. Only
44. See I Hale, Pleas of the Crown 14-15 (1736); I Hawkins, Pleas
of the Crown 1 (6th ed. 1787) ; Coke, Third Institutes 107 (1797) ; and see
my discussion, supra note 31, at 36-38.
45. Crimes grounded in the culture or mores of a people are not to be
confused with the imaginary concept of natural crimes. There is no sufficient
evidence indicative of any such concept as that of natural crimes, although
it may be regarded as established that all human societies have some rules
in the nature of criminal law on the regulation of external security (treason)
and sexual conduct. See Mueller, Tort, Crime and the Primitive, 46 J. Crim.
L., C. & P.S. 303 passim (1955). Here I am referring to crimes which are
part of the moral code of a given people at a given time. Jerome Hall calls
these actual crimes, "which we know are integrated in the mores; they have
some appreciable degree of public acceptance;" as contrasted with what he
calls formal crimes, which are not so accepted or integrated. The latter are,
however, potential actual crimes, because they may become part of the moral
code. See Hall, op. cit. supra note 16, at 552-53.
46. Error of law is injurious, e.g., it does not excuse.
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error facti could have any relevance at such a time. It could truly
be called the test of mens rea.47 And herein lies the crucial test for
the correctness of my assertion that the mental process is some-
thing entirely distinct from mens rea: an evil intention was im-
puted to the actor because he was deemed to have desired that
which he was irrebuttably presumed to know--and perhaps, without
exception truly did know-to be an evil act. But he could exculpate
himself by proving that his mental process was pure, i.e., that what
had been attributed to him was his act, with mental process (inten-
tion) and physical movement, but that he did lack an evil mind be-
cause he labored under a mistake of fact which did not permit him to
recognize the act as evil. Clearly, in such a case there is no mens rea,
although to say that there is no act would be quite absurd. It is
very regrettable, as I pointed out elsewheres -that today's penal laws
no longer represent, and stem from, the mores of the community.
But under such circumstances it was easy to misinterpret the old
misleading slogan of act and intent, and to equate the mens rea, with
the mental process part of the act-which constitutes a de-ethiciza-
47. It is not part of this paper to discuss the "defenses" which exclude
the act, though a brief mention should be made of the most important In-
fancy and insanity have been mentioned already. It is noteworthy that in-
sanity may sometimes (e.g., under the right-wrong formulation or in cases
of "partial insanity", United States v. Parelius, 83 F. Supp. 617 (D. Hawaii
1949), and intoxication does (though not quite correctly) only, operate in the
sphere of mens rea. Hall, op. cit. supra note 16, at 427-76, with re-examination
and reform proposals. Id., at 466-76. In these instances the law merely deems
the perpetrator incapable of forming a particular component or element of
mens rea, regarding the act itself as still a rational product of the defendantes
mental process. Superior force is another instance in which the act may be
excluded. There is some doubt about the classification of duress and coercion.
I deem such defenses to go to the mens rea, rather than the actus reus, be-
cause the defendant's physical movements in such cases are the result of a
rational mental process. There has been choice, though the alternative to the
act committed made the choice socially acceptable. Therefore, we cannot talk
of an evil mind.
Williams believes that "at the present day the exemption from responsi-
bility, such as it is, given by the 'act' doctrine could, in respect of the require-
ment of will, just as well be put on the ground of mens rea." Williams, op. cit.
supra not 16, at 15. It is true that a driver who unlawfully blocks a road-
way because blocked traffic prevents him from moving his vehicle either for-
ward or backward could just as well be excused by reason of not having a
mens rea as for want of an act. See Commonwealth v. Brooks, 99 Mass. 434(1868). Similar situations can be easily imagined. But such an intermixture
of two basically different concepts might have detrimental consequences, e.g.,
on the insanity issue, on corresponding civil damage actions, etc., but especially
in cases of clear statutory absolute criminal liability. Where the criminal
statute is one of absolute liability, the mens rea requirement has been dis-
pensed with. To say that not even an act (i.e., the mental process part there-
of) is required, would be the acme of absurdity. Such cases, however, are
not unheard of precisely for the reason that the entire mental element of
crime has been treated as a unity, under mens rea, in flagrant disregard of
the fact that the mental process aspect of an act is something entirely distinct
from a mens rea.
48. See Mueller, op. cit. supra note 29.
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tion of the mens rea concept-and to arrive at the rule, common
today, that the defendant need not know that what he did is wrong,
as long as he knew what he did. My point is that since moral educa-
tion no longer serves us as a guide as to what is prohibited, a
knowledge or awareness of unlawfulness (or at least a violation of a
duty to keep informed about a special segment of legislation)
ought to be recognized as a necessary mens rea requirement to-
day. Indeed the "rea' of the mens rea requirement admits of no
other choice than this: that for modem offenses which are not
grounded in the community's moral consciousness the modem
counterpart of the old (ethically-morally) evil mind, namely the
modem concept of an awareness of unlawfulness of the act, must
be introduced,4 9 and it makes little or no difference whether the
offense is one of commission or of omission.
Now we can sum up: It is this awareness of evil, the sense of
doing something which one ought not, which constitutes the crux or
substance of mens rea at common law. Similarly, in the case of
statutory additions to the common law, it may be the mere aware-
ness of unlawfulness of the particular act,50 which constitutes the
mens rea, though as legal prohibitions may, and frequently do, be-
come part of the moral-cultural code of the community, it may
again become the "sense of doing something which one ought not,"
-rather than the awareness of unlawfulness-which becomes the
substance of mens rea for a particular offense.
49. That, incidentally, would lead to the salutary rule that excusable
error of law as to these offenses -usually of a regulatory nature- would
serve as a defense: since the existence of the legal prohibition, expressed in
the particular statute, is itself a fact, error facti excusat applies. (The standard
of the excusable could be the duty to keep informed about the legal regulation
governing conduct in which the defendant is peculiarly engaged. For example,
while it is not a rule of our moral code that butter must contain a certain
percentage of fat, it is a known rule of our moral code that government
regulates the production of butter. Thus, the dairy man must keep informed
about laws and regulations governing the manufacture of butter. It is not
excusable if he fails to keep posted about such laws.)
As to culturally accepted offenses there is little danger in retaining
error juris nocet, because it would be idle to permit a defendant to contend
that he did not know about the unlawfulness of murder or larcency. Though
difficulties will be encountered in cases of erroneous belief in a right to use
force against unlawful attacks and in similar situations. Existing law cer-
tainly has not properly resolved these difficult questions, and the problem
can hardly be solved in this footnote treatment of matter marginal to our
major topic.
A decision on whether a particular offense belongs to the cultural
heritage of the people or has been integrated in the mores, on the one hand,
or whether it is merely a regulatory offense, inoffensive absent statute, may
be regarded as a decision of a question of fact.
50. Or perhaps only the failure to live up to a duty to know of the
prohibition, as suggested in note 49, supra. Such a reckless or negligent dis-
regard of a socio-legal duty could well be termed negligence (or reckless-
ness) of law.
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Mens rea, then, is not the mere psychic relation between act and
actor, it is, rather, the ethico-legal negative value of the deed (ap-
pearing in various legally prescribed forms), i.e., it is a community
value of which the perpetrator at the time of the deed knows the
existence and that it will zterialize when the deed becomes
known. 51
As mentioned repeatedly, it is a well known fact that in the
sphere of regulatory offenses the mens rea requirement has been
frequently dispensed with, not only by confounding mens rea with
the mental process aspect of act, as above described, but also by
express legislative mandate, or by implication which prompted some
courts so to conclude. There is, of course, nothing which could
prevent legislatures from throwing the common law mens rea re-
quirement out of the window,52 thus creating absolute liability of-
fenses, just as there is nothing which would prevent a despot from
disregarding even more, namely the maxim nullum crimen sine
lege.r3 Such decisions are in the nature of policy decisions dictated
by belief in greater effectiveness of such laws, or they may rest on
devious political considerations. That such considerations have
led to ridiculous results, likely to lessen effectiveness of the law,
and, what is worse, that they are offensive ethically, I have tried
to point out before. 4
We are now in a position to return to our consideration of the
forms of mens rea. It will be remembered that we stopped after
discussion of the commensurate form, in which the mens rea
rests precisely on the same level as the actus reus.
2. Additional mens rea.
Observation of decided cases shows us that in a number of in-
stances the law demands more than an evil intention to do precisely
that which is, and is known to be, the harm. In such cases the law
wishes to mete out a particularly severe punishment for a particu-
larly evil thought or disposition. It does not concern us at the
51. See my discussion in To the Memory of Ernst Seelig, 47 J. Crim.
L., C. & P.S. 539, 543 (1957), indicating where I have borrowed from Seelig,
although Seelig's theory is not completely acceptable.
52. At least so the courts have said in holding that the due process
clause does not protect against criminal conviction for wrong-doing of which
the defendant was unaware. E.g., see Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota,
218 U.S. 57 (1910), and Lambert v. California, by considerably narrowing
the scope of the Shevlin-Carpenter Co. case constitutes the first major
improvement.
53. The German (1935) and Russian (1926) analogy provisions are
well-known examples. See Hall, op. cit. mspra note 16, at 41-45, n. 55.
54. Mueller, op. cit. .supra note 29.
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present whether or not the law is justified in doing so. Suffice it to
say that it does. Thus, murder in the first degree deals with the
same actus reus as murder in the second degree, but the punishment
is higher for an established particularly evil mind of the defendant,
a mind which encompasses more than the intention to kill, namely
premeditation and deliberation, 55 elements which have no counter-
part in the actus reus. This is not to say that we do not rely on
evidence of the defendant's conduct, but here we do so simply be-
cause we cannot look into the defendant's mind. The actus reus in
the sense of prohibited harm done, does not differ in case of mur-
der I from that in the case of murder II. And so it is in burglary,
where we require a state of mind in addition to the basic mens rea
for the basic actus reus, breaking and entering; we require the
intention to engage in felonious activity or theft in the building
broken and entered.5 6
This form of mens rea, therefore, can be easily recognized in
that it demands an evil mind in addition to that required for the
basic evil act which is, and is known to be, wrong. Indeed, this
additional mens rea requirement is ordinarily so pronounced that
we tend to forget, occasionally, that there is also a basic nens rea
requirement in such cases. Burglary is a good example. The prose-
cutor ordinarily introduces evidence of the actus reus of breaking
and entering, omitting evidence of the intention to break and enter,
and thereafter he will prove an intention to commit a felony or
larceny in the building broken and entered; and the defendant
usually fails to protest about the failure to prove the intention to
break and enter-even in cases where the act of breaking and
entering does not necessarily speak for itself-because everybody
concerned concentrates on the proof of the crucial requirement of
an intention to engage in felony or larceny in the building. It is for
55. Cf. Wechsler and Michael, supra note 19, 1261 at 1282-84, to the
effect-rightly and considered on the basis of modem psychological insight-
"that deliberation has no independent significance in relation to character and
that the importance usually accorded it properly belongs to other factors
which are its concomitants such, for example, as lapse of time, or to still
other factors which it evidences, such as knowledge and intent." This is the
synopsis of forceful argument for the abolition of premeditation as an addi-
tional mens rea form. De lege ferenda, substitute criteria for segregating
particularly vicious and considered killings may be the ends and means of
the perpetrator. Id. at 1277-80. My analysis of mens rea, however teleological,
is de lege lata and attempts to portray, as accurately as that is possible in a
generalization, the existing law. I must, therefore, recognize that deliberation
is being employed as an indication of additional mens rea to distinguish
between murder and especially evil murder, however crude the criterion of
distinction employed by the law may be.
56. In jurisdictions where larceny requires the mens rea element of
lucri causa, larceny also falls into this category.
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this reason of special emphasis on the additional mens rea require-
ment, above and beyond the ordinary and commensurate mens rea
requirement, that we are justified in calling this form in which
mens rea appears: additional mens rea. But we must not forget
that we are dealing here with a mens rea superimposed on an
ordinary mens rea for an ordinary actus reus. We are not dealing
with the case where it is only a particular mens rea which makes
an otherwise inoffensive act criminal.
57
3. Adequate mens rea.
We can next observe that the criminal law employs a form of
mens rea which quite clearly does not measure up to the commen-
surate form which we met first. In such cases the actus reus may be
the same as that of a more severe offense, requiring a more severe
mens rea. But in these cases the actus reus has been brought about
by a mind, though evil or blame-worthy, which did not intend to do
that which resulted. Recklessness, negligence, heedlessness, disre-
gard for the safety of others, are instances of this sort, and legisla-
tures have no difficulty thinking of new terminology.58
In the case of conscious creation of risk, e.g., certainly in most
cases of recklessness, the "evil" or "blameworthy" character of the
frame of mind is self-evident. But it may be thought that the de-
fendant who is negligent without being conscious thereof, i.e., by an
objective standard, lacks an evil mind. The answer is simple
enough: in these cases the mens rea may be regarded as of an
omissive nature. It is precisely the attitude of self-centered thought-
lessness and disregard for the rights of others despite the capacity
and opportunity to realize and respect these rights which con-
stitutes this form of mens rea. Thus, while the difference between
adequate mens rea and the three other forms of mens rea is one of
form, it is also one of intensity of concentration. But the nature of
mens rea, the value character, is the same for all forms. This is
not to deny that our law does use an objective standard-the rea-
sonable man under the circumstances-in order to ascertain whether
the defendant's mind was sufficiently blameworthy. But in the case
of negligence, as well as in the instances of result-qualification, 5
57. In ra, text at note 61.
58. The dividing line between intention (which may take the form of
not quite wishing for the result, but being afraid that fairly certainly it is
bound to happen) and a gambler's reckless attitude about the outcome is an
arbitrary one and subject to different policy considerations in different
societies. On the limit between intention and recklessness in general see
Weichsler and Michael, op. cit. supra note 19, at 709.
59. Infra, text at note 71.
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the law operates with an objective standard which, based on experi-
ence, closely approximates that under which the defendant must
have operated in fact. In my opinion, therefore, we are here con-
fronted with the use of a schematic and crude way of establishing
the mens rea, but one which nevertheless evidences the law's con-
cern for the mental attitude of the defendant. Thus, while a com-
pletely subjective standard might do better justice in individual
cases, it might be incomparably more difficult of application than
the "objective" way of establishing adequate mens rea in the
individual. "Such a theory of negligence," as Moreland said, "is
founded on blame-worthiness no less than a subjective one. The
difference lies in the fact that the tests of blameworthiness are ex-
ternal... ."" But in any event, although not quite commensurate,
this form of mens rea is sufficient or adequate to convince the trier
of fact of its sufficiently evil nature in relation to the harm pro-
duced. We are, therefore, justified in calling this lower-than-stand-
ard frame of mind the adequate mens rea form.
4. Independent mens rea.
Lastly, there is a group of crimes which consist of acts ordi-
narily not at all criminal or even only unlawful, and added mens rea
requirements which are of quite an independent nature. Here the
act, again consisting of mental process and physical movement, is
inoffensive in itself, for which reason its commission cannot be
said to be accompanied by any mens rea at all. What makes the act
unlawful is its recognized misuse for socially harmful purposes by
persons with evil intentions of a particular sort. Thus, it is ordi-
narily quite inoffensive, in fact it may amount to an act of chivalry,
if a gentleman gives a lady a ride in his automobile from state A to
state B where she desires to travel. But if this gentleman does so
with a sinister frame of mind, i.e., "for the purpose of prostitution or
debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose. ."- the act ceases
to be lawful (and its perpetrator presumably ceases to be a gentle-
man), and it becomes a federal crime consisting of an act which
60. Moreland, A Rationale of Criminal Negligence 40 (1944). More-
land completes this sentence with a quotation from Holmes, The Common
Law 50 (1881) : "independent of the degree of evil in the particular person's
motives or intentions." I do not regard this statement as acceptable. Self-
centered concentration or mental pre-occupation which is so strong that it
leads to the disregard of the interests of others is an evil frame of mind.
Since this frame of mind leads to criminal liability only when it exists in a
high degree of concentration, all indications are that our test works fairly
well, despite its crudeness. Of course, beyond that, I am very much in favor
of subjectivising the negligence test as far as administratively feasible.
61. 62 Stat. 812 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1952).
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derives its evilness only from the fact that it is accompanied by an
independent frame of mind, all as specified by statute. This form of
mens rea may then properly be called the independent mens rea.
E. Principle of legality in relation to inens rea.
One final note is necessary before concluding the subject of the
forms of mens rea. Ordinarily, the mens rea form which the legis-
lature or the common law prescribes for a particular crime, must
be established, and no different form will do.6 2 If the actual mens rea
form is lower, smaller, less grave, than the one called for, we may
be confronted with a lower degree of the same offense category,
or with a lesser included offense, or with no offense at all. But
more than that is required. It does not suffice to entertain just any
undirected evil mind of the individual nature and the prescribed
form, say intention or recklessness, but this evil mind, or mens rea,
must ordinarily be directly related to the evil act, actus reus,
charged. A subject matter concurrence is required which extends
the mens rea to all elements of the actus reus. 63 Thus, on principle,
in order to have murdered, the defendant must have entertained the
mens rea form "intention to kill a human being." (Actus reus and
mens rea are commensurate and concurrent.) And so, likewise
on principle, a defendant who, while engaged in unlawfully shooting
his neighbor's chicken, happens to kill his neighbor accidentally,
should not be guilty of murder, since the mens rea he entertained
did not happen to coincide with the actus reus of murder. He may
be guilty of negligent homicide, depending on the legislative defini-
tion of this offense, but he should not be guilty of murder.6 4
62. As a matter of constitutional law there can be no conviction of an
offense higher than the one specified in the indictment, though conviction for
a lesser included offense may be had.
63. Definitional Elements: In want of a better term the elements of an
offense may be called definitional elements, since the offense is defined in these
terms by law. Definitional elements may pertain to the actus reus, as in the
text above, or to the mens rea. Indeed, mens rea itself, whether mentioned in
the statute or not, is a definitional element by common law standards. But it
must be emphasized again that modem courts and legislatures have fre-
quently abolished the definitional element of mens rea for reasons of a
completely misunderstood utilitarianism.
64. A great number of decisions, of course, hold cases of this nature to
be murder, on various possible grounds, often on principles of the felony-
murder rule. This rule and similar propositions rest on the ancient maxim
of versari h; re illicita, that he who engages in unlawful conduct is supposed
to incur criminal liability for all consequences whatsoever. This principle is
supposed to have a deterrent effect, though nobody has been able to prove
that. We can readily see that the versari principle operates with some mighty
big assumptions and may well rest on erroneous considerations which are
probably of greater detriment than benefit to law enforcement, though this
is not the place to prove it
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At this point it is proper to summarize what has been said. This
can best be done, perhaps, by presenting a modified version of the
Robinson chart which will take my criticism of Robinson's approach
and my suggestions into consideration:
THE ELEMENTS OF A CRIME
'within the sub-
conscious mind,
I. influenced by
Mental impressions re- raspects of:
Process ceived through J1. creative-
of a the conscious ness and
rational mind and stored t2. duration
(A. mind impressionsfrom uncon-
Actus scious mindreffs esubject to:
A1. environmental conditions,
II ) a implicitly necessary, or
Physical b required explicitly as definitional
Movement elementsI 2. rules of causation
Te. 3. normof harmThe "
Crime
U1. cultural (actual) criminal law:
0 I. Knowledge of all facts tantamount to
o Substance: knowledge of evil nature of act
The ethico- 12. regulatory (formal) criminal law:
legal nega- Knowledge of all facts plus awareness
tive value of unlawfulness (occasionally failure
of the deed to get informed about law in violation
B. lof duty to stay informed)
Mens 1. commensurate form:
rea E.g., in murder II or larceny. Also,
statutory terms like "knowingly" or
"intentionally" should be thus inter-
preted. Typical form, unless law speci-
fies otherwise
2. additional form:Form: E.g., in murder I or burglary
3. adequate form:
Recklessness, heedlessness, negligence,
etc., when so specified by law
4. independent form:
E.g., in Mann Act violations
II. WHAT EXCEPTIONS TO THE COMMON LAW MENS REA
REQUIREMENT DID THE COMMON LAW ITSELF DEVELOP ?5
Having established a working concept of mens rea and having
ascertained that it is an ethico-legal value concept, we can now
proceed to test its validity. We shall do this by investigating all
65. On this part of the paper I had the benefit of the advice of Professor
Herbert Wechsler, Columbia Law School, which is gratefully acknowledged.
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alleged instances in which at common law mens rea was supposedly
not a requirement for conviction. Should we find such instances of
any material sort, there would be a strong temptation to conclude
that mens rea, after all, is not an ethico-legal concept, but merely
the mental process aspect of the act. Or at least, one could say that
mens rea was (and is) not a universally required common law
element of crime.
A survey of common law offenses makes it immediately ap-
parent that any possible exception to the mens rea requirement may
be complete or it may be only partial. It is complete when the law
does not care at all about the mens rea of the offender and imposes
liability for the act alone. 0 This may also take the form of sub-
jecting the crucial element of the offense, i.e., that by which the
offense is recognizable as blameworthy, to an objective standard. 17
It is partial when the law is concerned about the requisite mens rea
for a basic criminal act but imposes additional liability above and
beyond the desired, intended, encompassed or encompassable,
68
foreseen or foreseeable, 69 harm; either by ignoring the defendant's
attitude in this respect entirely, or by imposing an objective, rather
than a subjective standard.70 The partial exceptions may take either
of two general forms. One partial exclusion of mens rea may pertain
to a given result, as in the case of one version of the felony murder
rule-where liability for murder is imposed although no more than
the mens rea for a basic non-homicidal felony need be made out.71
Or it may refer to a single element of an offense which is criminal
even absent this specific element, but which is a greater crime if the
element is present, whether known to the offender or not. For
example, B may be guilty of statutory fornication if he has extra-
66. A statutory example of this sort underlies the prosecution in the
already discussed case of United States v. Gris, 247 F.2d 860 (2d cir. 1957).
In such cases the court is not at all concerned with the defendant's actual
awareness of wrongfulness. The statute prevents the court from making any
inquiry of that sort. (Supposing, of course, that the statute has been properly
interpreted as one meaning to impose absolute liability, which may well be
doubted for the statute applied in United States v. Gris.)
67. See discussion of "objective standards" in the section on libel,
infra, text at notes 80-94.
68. Depending on whether the commensurate or the adequate form of
mens rea is required.
69. Depending on whether the commensurate or the adequate form of
mens rea is required.
70. The latter is particularly applicable to the second exception, infra,
but may also be found in the former. For collection and discussion of refer-
ences see Wechsler and Michael, op. cit. supra note 19, at 709-11.
71. See reference in Mueller, op. cit. supra note 29, at 42-43. Full dis-
cussions at Wechsler and Michael, op. cit. supra note 19, at 709-17, 745;
Moreland, Law of Homicide 42-54 (1952) ; Crum, Causal Relations and the
Felony Murder Rule, 1952 Wash. U.L.Q. 191.
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marital intercourse with a female, but he may be guilty of statutory
rape, a much more severe offense, if, whether he knew it or not,
the female "victim" was below a specified age. B had a mens rea
covering a relatively small offense, but he is being convicted for an
offense of a gravity and nature not completely encompassed by his
mens rea. We may call these instances of complete or partial ex-
ceptions to the mens rea requirement forms of complete or partial
absolute liability.
There is indeed one further possible form of absolute liability,
namely those cases in which the penal law imposes a liability upon
the mere happening of an event which is attributable (though not
really imputable) to the defendant, i.e., where not even an act has
been committed. An example would be the already mentioned case
of a defendant who, by strong hands, is thrown into a city-owned
bed of chrysanthemums and who was to be charged with destruc-
tion of property or malicious mischief; or the case of an automobilist
who "obstructs" traffic because he is stuck in a traffic jam. I am not
aware of any strong claims to the effect that the common law prac-
ticed any absolute liability in either of the two latter forms, although
the matter should perhaps be subjected to some scrutiny. But
familiar examples suggest themselves in the first form of partial
exclusion. The felony-murder and misdeameanor-manslaughter
rules have been mentioned already and other examples could be
uncovered. This, however, I must postpone for a future occasion.
The issue of partially absolute liability is not pressing in terms of
my immediate objective because a number of rationalizations may
be made, all of which suggest that the principle of versari in re
illicita on which this exception rests, offers a fair explanation along
lines of the mens rea or guilt-principle. It is noteworthy that in
these cases, the law will not impose a penalty on the actor unless
he has evidenced at least some blameworthy frame of mind. Often-
times it has not even been recognized that these cases are not
totally in accord with the guilt-principle, as, indeed, one may inter-
pret them as a crude way of doing a rough sort of justice by stereo-
typed standards, similar to those applied in establishing criminal
negligence objectively. We meet this crude standard throughout
our penal law. Suppose, for example, that a thief decides to steal,
for whatever motive, a watch. In a crowded department store he sees
a watch exhibited which he remembers having seen elsewhere
marked at $19.50. He steals the watch, is apprehended and tried for
grand larceny of an object worth in excess of $20.00 as, indeed, the
price of this particular watch was $21.50. The difference in liability
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may be that between a maximum of incarceration in the county jail
for one year, and imprisonment in the penitentiary for a maximum
period of five years, though the difference in the objective quality
of the harm must be measured in monetary terms of a paltry $2.00.
The objective quality which, according to our law, need not be
encompassed by the defendant's mens rea, qualifies the intent.
Many crimes are of this nature, but the law has long given up any
attempt to measure mens rea with apothecaries' scales and no
longer makes, or perhaps never did make, fine distinctions between
result qualification and direct result.
Since, as indicated, in all these instances of partially absolute
criminal liability the law can be credited with at least a semblance
of conformity to a crude concept of blameworthiness, the concept
of partially absolute liability does not interest us any further for
purposes of this specific inquiry, which attempts to establish clear
and material departures of the common law from the guilt-principle.
At the same time we should keep in mind, however, that any
attempt to bring our penal law in accord with the mens rea principle
must ultimately tackle the task of detailed analysis of partially abso-
lute liability as well.
This leaves us, for study, those cases in which the common law is
supposed not to have bothered, or not to bother, about any re-
quirement of mens rea whatsoever.
The most often cited instances of common law criminal liability
without mens rea are said to lie in the law of libel and nuisances.7 2
While there is some contention that the common law of libel has
operated with direct absolute liability, the more vehement assertion
is that the common law, in the fields mentioned, disregards mens rea
by providing for the liability of an entrepreneur for the unlawful acts
of his agent. Thus, the proprietor of a printing or publishing estab-
lishment is said to be absolutely liable for the libels published in his
establishment. The owner of a factory is said to be absolutely liable
for the criminal nuisances caused by the acts of his employees within
the scope of their employment, whether prohibited to act in the
prescribed manner or not. Strictly speaking, these examples would
constitute more than criminality without mens rea. Not only does
the person against whom the law moves lack any mens rea, but he
has not even committed the prescribed act. Such, indeed, would be
a grave departure from the principles of the common law of crimes.
A few writers have found a third instance in which -liability is
based on such considerations: in the law of husband and wife. The
72. General references as to loc. of each assertion, infra, at notes 96,
140, 184.
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husband, as the head of the household, is said to be criminally
responsible for offenses committed by his wife in the common home.
This form of liability is in the nature of vicarious liability, a form
of liability otherwise known only in tort law. Strictly defined, vicari-
ous liability restricts itself to holding liable an innocent party in lieu
of the true perpetrator. As we shall see below, vicarious liability had
acquired an additional meaning, namely the additional responsi-
bility of an innocent party above and beyond the liability of the
actor. Thus, vicarious liability is both supplanted and supplemented
liability.7"
At this point it should give us a feeling of satisfaction to note
that the pitiful nature of these alleged common law exceptions to
the mens rea requirement tend to confirm our belief that common
law mens rea is an ethico-legal concept of virtually universal nature.
We shall look at these three spheres of penal law in order to ascer-
tain the extent to which this belief in the existence of criminal
liability without mens rea, at common law, is justified.
A. Criminal Libel
Common law libel has been defined as the malicious publication
of durable defamation.7 4 It is difficult to make any other generaliza-
tion about the common law of criminal libel.7 5 There never has been
an abundance of cases in this field, and in recent years such cases
have become exceedingly rare. With respect to direct commission of
the offense7 6 of libel, the rules are admitted by all writers to be
similar to those which apply to the direct commission of other
crimes and misdemeanors at common law. Actus non facit reum nisi
wens sit rea is generally said to be applicable, though at least two
propositions affect the firmness of mens rea in the case of libel. The
required malice is understood to be no more than the absence of
justification or excuse,77 hence really the intention to publish a
durable defamation. But the defendant may exculpate himself by
showing that the statement he made is true and that he acted with
73. For a competent discussion of further theoretical aspects of vicarious
criminal liability see Sayre, Criminal Responsibility for the Acts of Anothcr,
43 Harv. L. Rev. 689 (1930). For a discussion of vicarious criminal liability
in the form of corporate criminal liability see Mueller, op. cit. supra note 31,
appended bibliography at 4849.
74. Perkins, op. cit. supra note 20, at 351.
75. For an excellent brief survey of current state law, as well as his-
torical matter, see Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Beauharnais v.
Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, n.5 at 254-57 (1952). Twenty American states follow
the common law rule without material modification.
76. 4 Blackstone, Commentaries *151.
77. Perkins, op. cit. supra note 20, at 357-58.
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good motives and for justifiable ends. This is. a virtually universally
accepted rule.78 It follows that libel is the intentional publication of
a durable and untrue defamation with bad motives and for unjusti-
fiable ends, in which the untrue nature of the publication and the bad
motives and unjustifiable ends are presumed. Such a reversal of
proof of a mens rea requirement has been regarded as an inroad
on the mens rea principle. Such it is not. It may be inconsistent with
common law procedural standards, but by virtue of the fact that
the presumption7 0 may be rebutted, the mens rea is unaffected.
The other supposed inroad arises from the fear that objective,
rather than subjective, standards are to b employed for deter-
mining the presence of definitional elements; for instance the guilt-
exclusionary element of truth, which is usually applicable only where
coupled with good motives and justifiable ends.80 In the common
law prior to American state legislation, as indeed in English crimi-
nal law today, the truth of the matter asserted was no defense."'
Thus, the common law offense of defamatorT libel was one which
had an independent mens rea, i.e., only the evil intention made an
otherwise unobnoxious act criminal. Where truth is no defense,
the mens rea consists entirely of bad motives, and there can, then,
be no danger that by disregarding a defendant's honest mistake as
to the truth, an absolute liability may be imposed. But where, in
American law, truth is a defense, the question arises whether the
defendant's reasonable belief in the truth, after proper inquiry,
will be tantamount to actual truth; in other words, whether error
facti excusat is applicable. If not, it might be thought that we are
confronted with an incident of absolute liability.
In the first place, it may not be quite clear at the trial whether
or not the matter asserted is true. In this case the rule prevails that
78. Id. at 358.
79. May, in his text, expresses some surprise that even malice (intent
to publish) is presumed against the defendant, citing, among others, Rex v.
Harvey, 2 B. & C. 257, 107 Eng. Rep. 379 (K.B. 1823), Smith v. State, 32
Tex. 594 (1870)-but in this case inalice was used in the sense of an inten-
tion to injure, id. at 597-and Commonwealth v. Blanding, 20 Mass. (3
Pick.) 304 (1825), adding: "There appears to be no objection to inferring
malice but the distinction between an inference and a presumption should
be insisted upon. See Root v. King, 7 Cowen (N.Y.) 613, 625." It is sub-
mitted that in the sense used by the cited cases that part of mens rea which is
commensurate with the actus reus is always presumed from the actus reus.
But May's insistence on the distinction between I-resumption and inference
is technically proper. May, Law of Crimes 154 n. 8 (4th ed., Sears and
Weihofen 1938).
80. For differing state rules see May, op. cit. supra note 79, at 155.
81. Perkins, op. cit. supra note 20, at 358. Kenny, Outlines of Criminal
Law 180 (Turner and Armitage ed. 1952), though for seditious libel the
rule has been otherwise since Lord Campbell's Act, 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96 (1843).
Likewise, in English tort law the defense of truth is recognized. Kenny,
op. cit. supra, at 180.
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the jury should acquit if they have a reasonable doubt whether the
matter published is true or not.82 But in the second place, where
the matter published is clearly untrue, though the defendant rea-
sonably believed it to be true, the rule is said to be otherwise and
the defendant cannot be excused . 3 This rule, if correct, is incon-
sistent with error facti excusat and constitutes an instance of abso-
lute liability. Burdick, to support the proposition, cites only one
decision, the Massachusetts case of Commonwealth v. Snelling."'
Unfortunately, the case upholds the proposition for which Burdick
cited it. For failure of proof of actual truth the defendant was not
even permitted to benefit from his claim of good motives and justi-
fiable ends, since truth was, by an awkward statutory construction,
regarded as a prerequisite of such further proof of good motives
and justifiable ends.8 5 In thus imposing absolute liability for libel,
the court did not and could not follow any precedent, nor has the
case been followed subsequently on this point. It may be regarded
as a forerunner of statutory absolute liability in which Massachusetts
later excelled, 86 but it cannot be said to represent the common law
of libel, which is clearly contra. Where, for instance, a defendant
reasonably and honestly, but mistakenly, believes his publication to
refer to a true matter, protected by a qualified privilege, yet it turns
out that the matter published is in fact not true, error facti excusat
will protect the defendant and he is not criminally liable.87 Lastly, it
may be thought that an objective treatment of the definitional ele-
ment "defamatory," in defamatory libel and the various special
elements in the special offenses of libel, e.g., "obscene," "tending
toward a breach of the peace," or "blasphemous," may create abso-
lute liability. It is, no doubt, difficult to ascertain a community
standard, for example, of decency and propriety. Mr. Justice Frank-
furter's point of view, that there is such a standard,8  however
shifting it may be, is the only rational one. But there are cases
where the defendant, the public and the courts may honestly differ
on the subsumption of the particular incident under the general
standard. The better policy, it would seem, is to give the defendant
82. State v. Bush, 122 Ind. 42, 23 N.E. 677 (1889) ; State v. Wait, 44
Kan. 310, 24 Pac. 354 (1890) ; McDonald v. State, 73 Tex. Crim. 125, 164S.W. 831 (1914).
83. 3 Burdick, Law of Crime 178 (1946).
84. 32 Mass. (15 Pick.) 337 (1834).
85. Id. at 362. A better result was achieved in People v. Fuller, 238 Ill.
116, 133, 87 N.E. 336, 342 (1909).
86. Mueller, op. cit. supra note 29, at 47-48.
87. See State v. Lambert, 188 La. 967, 178 So. 508 (1938) ; Perkins,
op. cit. supra note 20, at 359-63. Cf., State v. Greenville Publ. Co., 179 N.C.
720, 102 S.E. 318 (1920).
88. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 254 (1952).
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the benefit of the doubt, in order to protect the integrity of the
mens rea principle and thus save defendants from conviction who
possibly may have made an honest effort to stay within the stand-
ards of the legally permissible, regardless of the personal moral
standpoint of the court. This position, as applied to seditious or
group libel, is fully in accord with Mr. Justice Holmes' "clear and
present danger test," used as a limitation of free speech. 9 "Ob-
scenity" likewise is judged by objective, i.e., community standards.
But courts ° and legislators 1 have made an honest, and it would
seem generally successful, attempt to abide by the community
standard as evidenced by the living law of the prevalent moral code.
These standards are ascertainable prior to a given publication, and
honest though unsuccessful attempts to meet the standard can be
and are taken into account at any stage of the prosecution, espe-
cially in sentencing. The same considerations apply to blasphemous
libel. The limit between religious truth and falsity, decency and
indecency, is an ascertainably community standard.9 2 Failure to
comply is usually indicative of failure to have ascertained the stand-
ard. But it is clearly misleading to explain the libel cases by saying
that "when the statute law expressly declares that a thing shall
not be done, it becomes ipso facto illegal to do it."193 I do not con-
tend that the present standard of our law, and that traditionally
applied by the common law, is a subjective one. It clearly is objec-
tive. But it is an ascertainable standard which, when flouted,
strongly indicates an intention to go outside the limits of the per-
missible, or a recklessness and nonchalance sufficient as mens rea
in matters about which our society as a whole has definite opinions.
This and no more is required by mens rea. All that can possibly
be advocated is a better disposition, as a matter of practice, of con-
ceivable hardship cases where there was an honest effort to comply.
An honest subsumption error should excuse.9 4
89. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) ; dissenting with
Mr. Justice Brandeis in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925).
90. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
91. Model Penal Code § 201.10 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957) and see
Schwartz, Criminal Obscenity Law: Portents from Recent Supreme Court
Decisions and Proposals of the Amercan Law Institute Model Penal Code,
29 Pa. Bar Ass'n Q. 8, 14-15 (1957).
92. State v. Chandler, 5 Del. (2 Harr.) 553 (1837).
93. Warburton, Leading Cases In The Criminal Law 5 (6th ed.,
Odgers and Armstrong, sub. tit. A Selection Of Leading Cases In The
Criminal Law 1932).
94. E.g., Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29 (1896), applying an
objective standard where a subjective one would have led to a reversal of
the conviction. Cf., Regina v. Hicklin, 3 Q.B. 360 (1868). Compare Model
Penal Code, § 207.10 (Tent Draft No. 6 1957), with excellent comment 14,
at pp. 49-51, especially on state statutes which, in abrogation of common law,
have introduced aspects of absolute liability.
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We can see thus, that the criminal law of libel, as developed
by the common law, does not operate with absolute liability in its
direct form. But much more serious than the supposition that there
is direct absolute liability in libel is the charge that the common
law, unaffected by modem legislation, operates with criminal lia-
bility in the vicarious form. The rule is a familiar one in the
common law of torts, where the problem is primarily one of loss
distribution. Even the innocent proprietor of a print shop which
published a defamatory matter was held strictly responsibile, as
it was deemed more equitable to shift the loss away from the
victim, and to the print shop owner who, among those responsible
in a purely causal sense, could financially best afford to sustain
it, though often only one party could be deemed really responsible
in a moral sense, the ordinarily indigent author of the libel. In
tort law the maxim qui facit per alium, facit per se prevails and
it could not be kept entirely out of the criminal law. Through
this confusion of civil and criminal remedies, a few common law
judges and virtually all text writers on the criminal law have
subscribed to the supposition that at common law95 the (indirect)
publisher of a criminal libel is likewise absolutely liable.96
Such a rule might have been a rational one in the era of the
one-man-print-shop operator. For the individual and sole owner-
operator it was almost impossible to commit a criminal libel in-
nocently. But, as we shall see, even in the small enterprises of
yesteryear the proprietor of the paper or serial in which libelous
matter appeared would occasionally have a good defense, and the
common law recognized such defenses to a large extent.
In the entire history of the English law only two cases stand for
the proposition that a publisher is criminally liable for his libelous
publication, or a sale thereof, regardless of intent, or defenses. In
other words, by these two cases the publisher or seller is criminally
responsible though he himself had nothing to do with the publica-
95. In England prior to Lord Campbell's Act 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96 (1843).
This section permits a newspaper proprietor (publisher), charged with
criminal libel, to show that the libel was published without his authority
and due to no lack of care on his part. Kenny, op. cit. upra note 81, at 34.
This statute affirmed-in an era of some doubt-the applicability of the mens
rea requirement in English criminal libel law.
96. I Bishop, op. cit. supra note 30, §§ 219.2-221; 2 Wharton, Criminal
Law 33 1964, 1990 (12th ed., Ruppenthal 1932); 3 Burdick, op. cit. supra
note 83, § 802; I Russell, Crime c. 49 (10th ed. 1950) ; Clark and Marshall,
A Treatise on the Law of Crimes § 189 (e) (5th ed. Kearney 1952) ; May,
op. cit. supra note 18, § 38; Williams, op. cit. supra note 16, § 77.1; Kenny,
op. cit. supra note 81, § 28; Cross and Jones, An Introduction To Criminal
Law art. 14 (3d ed. 1953) ; of which Bishop's work contains the most con-
sidered and cautious statements. The most recent criminal law text, Perkins,
op. cit. supra note 20, at 364, likewise presents a very careful account.
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tion other than mere ownership of the publishing house or sales
establishment.97 But these two cases and a few others which came
close to the imposition of absolute liability were to convey the im-
pression that criminal libel required no mens rea at common law.
The doubtful cases require a brief comment.
Shortly before, and during, the French revolution cases of
criminal libel occurred with great frequency in England. Rex v.
Atmtond was to set the pattern. 8 As a practical matter the case
comes close to strict liability. Theoretically it stands for the proposi-
tion that a publisher may excuse himself by showing that he was not
privy to the libel, and neither counseled nor encouraged its publica-
tion. There was some evidence of a practice among publishers to
publish risky publications under the name of another publishing
house, without the latter's consent. Almond contended that the
libelous publication in question was no product of his. But the
evidence was deemed insufficient to rebut the presumption of his
own conduct.
Lord Mansfield had a great influence on the law of criminal
libel. Three libel cases bear his imprint. In 1772 he made it certain
that by his standards little, if anything, could excuse the publisher
of a criminal libel.9 9 Two years later he had to decide a case on the
following facts: A libelous publication came out of the defendant's
newspaper print shop. There was evidence that it was the defend-
ant's practice to inspect his daily paper at 5 o'clock every morning,
before its distribution. On the day in question defendant was ill
and did not appear until after the paper with the libelous matter
had been put into circulation. Defendant's horror about the publica-
tion, at least so he contended, could not undo its distribution. Lord
Mansfield remarked: "I dare say they never read a thousandth
part of what they publish. Are they, therefore, to justify their
publications, be they what they will, because they publish they
97. Rex v. Nutt, Fitzg. 47, 94 Eng. Rep. 647 (K-B. 1729), where the
Court of King's Bench ruled that the proprietor of a pamphlet shop is
criminally liable for the sale of a libelous publication by his servant, although
he knew nothing of either the receipt of the publication in the shop, nor of its
sale. Rex v. Walter, 3 Esp. 21, 170 Eng. Rep. 524 (K.B. 1799), same as to
publisher.
98. 5 Burr. 2686, 98 Eng. Rep. 411 (K.B. 1770).
99. "Upon motion for an information for a libel published against the
Hon. Mr. Charles Fox, on shewing cause to rule, the printer declared he was
not privy to the contents, nor to its being put into the paper; and was
greatly concerned it should ever have been published, and stopped the sale
immediately when he discovered it: and hoped, therefore, that the Court
would not grant the information. Lord Mansfield.--It goes for nothing, and
would be an excuse for all sorts of infamy. Rule absolute." Anon., Lofft 544,
98 Eng. Rep. 791 (K.B. 1772).
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know not what?"'10 The evidence was held to be admissible in
mitigation, but not in defense. Lord Mansfield still indicated that a
strong excuse may constitute a good defense, but he never had
occasion to find such an excuse. In the same year a further libel
case came before him. The defendant publisher was in confinement
at the time the libelous matter left his publishing house. Due to the
fact that the confined publisher had the opportunity to read his
paper daily and to be visited by his servants, such confinement was
held not to constitute a defense to the charge of criminal libel, Lord
Mansfield conceding that a tighter confinement might have been
a good defense. 0 1
We can say, then, that even by Lord Mansfield's strict stand-
ardsi0 2 criminal libel was not an offense of absolute liability. Justice
Cockburn called Lord Mansfield's criminal libel decisions "a dark
spot in the career of the learned lord .... "1 03 "The success of Mans-
field was qualified ... by the unwillingness of his colleagues and
successors to develop or even accept the principles he introduced."''
He had indicated a way toward absolute criminal liability of the
publisher of a libel. But only one later English case was to take
this step. 05
Kenyon, D. J., was still under Mansfield's influence. But he
did not go further. In Rex v. Topham he held that the law of crimi-
nal libel imputes an evil intent to the publisher, leaving it to him
to rebut.108 Two years later he indicated what he meant by rebuttal:
If the defendant could have shown that he had published the
paper in question without knowing its contents, as that he could
not read and was not informed of its tendency until afterwards,
that argument might have been pressed upon the jury.07
In the cases following, with the one exception noted,108 it was
held that it is up to the jury to decide whether the defendant pub-
100. Rex v. Williams, Lofft 759, 762, 98 Eng. Rep. 905, 906 (K.B.
1774).
101. Rex. v. Woodfall, Lofft 776, 98 Eng. Rep. 914 (K.B. 1774).
102. Even beyond the field of criminal libel Lord Mansfield is known
for his love of severity, e.g., I Radzinowicz, A History of English Criminal
Law-The Movement for Reform 471 (1948).
103. 67 L.T. (n.s.) 1 (1879).
104. Stone, The Province and Function of Law 274 (1946).
105. Rex. v. Walter, 3 Esp. 21, 170 Eng. Rep. 524 (K.B. 1799).
106. 4 T.R. 126, 100 Eng. Rep. 931 (K.B. 1791) and see my interpreta-
tion, mspra, text at note 78.
107. Rex v. Holt, 5 T.R. 436, 444, 101 Eng. Rep. 245, 250 (K.B. 1793).
The libel involved was of a seditious nature. There is a vague indication that
seditious libels were regarded with greater severity.
108. Rex v. Walter, 3 Esp. 21, 170 Eng. Rep. 524 (K.B. 1799).
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lished the libel with intent or not,1"9 and that the defendant may,
thus, rebut the inference of malice which arises from the fact of
publication of libelous matter, so as to convince the jury of his
innocence.110 In short, the defendant is only prima facie answerable,
subject to his ability to establish an exemption."1
Such was the law in 1843 when the Libel Act, popularly known
as Lord Campbell's Act, was passed.1 1 2 By section 7 the act pro-
vided that the publisher is not responsible for his servant's inde-
pendent act of publishing a criminal libel where the master is non-
negligently ignorant of the fact and can prove it. The statute, there-
fore, can be regarded as no more than a slight lift of the mens rea
requirement from the status of negligence or heedlessness of super-
vision in every instance, to that of a general lack of oversight of
the publishing business. For it now was recognized that "the prohi-
bition not to violate the law is impliedly involved in every service"
for which a master may employ a servant."13 Subsequent cases inter-
preting Lord Campbell's Act followed the interpretation given in
Regina v. Holbrook.' The belief in absolute criminal liability of
the publisher of a libel at common law must be regarded as errone-
ous. Indeed, in the second half of the nineteenth century, after Lord
Campbell's Act had left no further doubt that criminal libel requires
mens rea in all cases, two eminent judges pronounced that it had
always been the true rule at common law to admit a showing of the
exercise of due care by the publisher as a defense to the charge of
criminal libel,"15 and this is the law of England today."8
In America a single case squarely supports the rule of absolute
liability of a publisher of a criminal libel: Commonwealth v. Buck-
ingham, decided in the Boston, Massachusetts, Municipal Court in
109. Rex. v. Reeves, Peake Add. Cas. 84,170 Eng. Rep. 202 (N.P. 1796),
an interesting case. The House of Commons had declared by vote that the
publication in question was libelous, and had urged King George III to
cause a prosecution to be instituted. The attorney general, thereupon, pur-
suant to royal order, prosecuted the defendant The jury returned a verdict
of not guilty.
110. Rex. v. Harvey, 2 B. & C. 257, 107 Eng. Rep. 379 (K.B. 1823).
111. Rex. v. Gutch, M. & M. 432. 173 Eng. Rep. 1214 (N.P. 1829). But
Tenterden, C.J., came again rather close to talking in terms of strict
(vicarious) liability. Id. at 438, 173 Eng. Rep. at 1216.
112. Perkins, op. cit. supra note 20, at 358; Kenny, Outlines of Criminal
Law 180 (Turner and Armitage ed. 1952).
113. Regina v. Holbrook, 3 Q.B. 60 (1877). On second trial, 4 Q.B. 42
(1878), the major case interpreting Lord Campbell's Act.
114. Ibid.
115. Cockburn, J., in Lambri's Case, 67 L.T. (n.s.) 1 (1879); Lord
Coleridge, C. J., in Regina v. Ridgway, 71 L.T. (n.s.) 41 (1881).
116. Ibid. Regina v. Bradlaugh, 15 Cox Ct. Cas. 185 (1883) ; Regina v.
Ramsay, (1883) 15 Cox Ct. Gas. 231; Regina v. Munslow, 1 Q.B. 758 (1895).
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1824.11 Defendant publisher-proprietor was ill, and spent most of
his time at home. He had not appointed a substitute to supervise the
work in his office. 1 8 The jury was charged that "as the paper was
printed in the office of the defendant, by his servants, and for his
profit,"1 9 and as he has never disavowed it,12 ° he is in law answerable
for the contents."' 2'- The case was sent back for retrial and, upon
jury disagreement, was taken from them. 2 2 A second case arose
under a Pennsylvania statute, thought to be declaratory of the com-
mon law. The statute made writers, printers and publishers crimi-
nally liable for any and all libels published by them. Under this
statute the court found a publisher liable for the publication inserted
against his general order by a local editor. The court relied on "a
long line of cases" in support, of which it cited but two, Common-
wealth v. Morgan,'2 3 (which did require intent!) and a civil case.
But all those uncited cases were thought to be "remarkably uniform
and consistent .... "124
A third case closely approaches the same rule, but was decided
on principles of the law of contempt of court, rather than criminal
libel.125 Moreover, the court found that the publication of the
contemptuous matter had been made wilfully, though finding
ignorance of the contemptuous nature to be no excuse. Further
cases supporting the supposed common law rule of absolute liability
for the publication of a criminal libel could not be located.
The American rule is clear and, apart from one or two lower
court cases to the contrary, always has been that malice in the sense
of intent to publish the defamation is required to hold any defendant,
writer, printer or publisher, liable for the misdemeanor of libel. -12
In other words, from the fact of the publication of the defamation the
intent to publish the defamation may be deduced.127 This rule
applies to the author as well as the publisher, printer, or publisher-
proprietor. In Massachusetts and New York truth may be a good
117. Thacher, Criminal Cases 29 (1845).
118. Query, would the result have been different had he done so?
119. The mention of profit makes it clear that the court thought in
terms of civil loss distribution, showing an inability to make the switch from
civil to criminal law thinking.
120. But retraction surely does not alter the result of a libel in the
criminal law.
121. Thacher, Criminal Cases 29, 40 (1845).
122. Id. at n. 47.
123. 107 Mass. 199 (1871).
124. Commonwealth v. Willard, 9 W.N.C. 524, 526 (Pa. 1881).
125. People v. Wilson, 64 Ill. 195 (1872).
126. State v. White, 29 N.C. 180 (1847) ; People v. Eastman, 89 Misc.
596, 152 N.Y. Supp. 314 (1915), under N. Y. Pen. Law § 1344, declaratory of
common law.
127. For the general rationale see text at notes 77-78 supra.
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defense if the publication has been made with good motives and for
justifiable ends.1 28 This is the only tenable position.
Partially by judicial development and partially by statutes, which
are hardly more than declaratory of the common law, the rule with
respect to defenses has been stated in terms of negligence: A pub-
lisher is presumed to have knowledge of any libelous matter pub-
lished by, under, or through him, but the law will not hold him
criminally responsible unless he was negligent in the supervision
of his business. The defense would be that the publisher exercised
due care in the supervision of his publishing establishment, and
that his use of due care could not avert the result. 2 9 This makes it
clear that a publication by the publisher's employee in violation of
the publisher's order will not be attributed to him.130 It is the law
today, with or without statute, 3' that a publisher must take care
and investigate fully before he publishes, but when despite his
precautions a criminal libel occurs, the publisher must be shown
to have been negligent. 32 This rule encompasses mens rea fully.
In passing I should mention that the cases here discussed show
a different treatment by the courts depending on the nature of the
libel. As a sociological matter it is self-evident that one case may
obtain more judicial or jury sympathy than another. These sym-
pathies seem to have affected, though not become part of, legal
doctrine. Courts appeared less demanding on the question of mens
rea in cases of aggravating libels, more demanding in slighter libels.
It is impossible to form a pattern of these impressions. Without
relying on authority, counsel for defendant in Commonwealth v.
Buckingham urged upon the court that the libel was not directed
against the government, a magistrate, or one in high office; nor was
it such that the public or the individual might be disturbed, nor by
which the peace and happiness of the domestic circle may be dis-
128. Commonwealth v. Blanding, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 304 (1825);
Commonwealth v. Snelling, 32 Mass. (15 Pick.) 337 (1834); Barthelemy
v. People, 2 Hill 248 (N.Y. 1842); Commonwealth v. Bonner, 50 Mass.(9 Met.) 410 (1845).
129. Commonwealth v. Morgan, 107 Mass. 199 (1871) ; Commonwealth
v. Damon, 136 Mass. 441 (1884) ; State v. Mason, 26 Ore. 273, 38 Pac. 130(1894); Benton v. State, 49 N.J.L. 551, 36 Atl. 1041 (Ct. Err. & App.
1897) ; People v. Fuller, 238 Ill. 116, 87 N.E. 336 (1909).
130. Commonwealth v. Rovnianek, 12 Pa. Super. 86 (1899), in which
case the master was out of state when, in disobedience to his orders, the
libelous publication was made.
131. A collection of statutory references may be found at Hale, The
Law of the Press 125-27 (1948). American statutes differ from each other
only as to minor aspects.
132. Benton v. State, 59 N.J.L. 551, 36 At. 1041 (Ct. Err. & App.
1897).
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turbed, nor was it of a seditious nature.133 The test of excuse in the
case of a seditious libel, it will be recalled, 3 was rather strict as a
practical matter, as was that in the case of a contempt of court.13 5
In a more recent Minnesota case, State v. Workers' Socialist Pub-
lishing Co.,136 the libel charged amounted to criminal syndicalism,
under a statute which provided that "every editor or proprietor of
a book, newspaper, or serial, and every manager of a ... corpora-
tion by which any... newspaper ... is issued, is chargeable with
the publication of any matter contained in such book, newspaper, or
serial."'' 37 Despite this strict language, the court refused to apply
the statute under circumstances negativing any presumption of
privity, or connivance, or want of ordinary precaution.1 38 It is grati-
fying to see a modern decision adhering to, rather than abandoning,
the requirements of mens rea, if only in the form of criminal negli-
gence, and even in the case of a libel of an aggravated nature.
Two or three older lower court cases notwithstanding, it is, and
has been, the rule at common law, in America as well as in England,
that: (a) the misdemeanor of libel requires mens rea as to all
elements. The use of a community standard, rather than a subjective
standard, for determination of the nature of the publication, as a
material element of the offense, has, on the whole, not created palpa-
bly unjust decisions inconsistent with mens rea; (b) a publisher is
not criminally liable for the libel published for him or through his
facilities, unless he was heedless, reckless, or negligent in the con-
duct of his business, through which lack of care the publication of
the libelous matter has come about. This form of liability, therefore,
is not one of vicarious liability, but one of direct liability for an
omission, with the requirement of mens rea in the form of intention
or negligence.
The universal doctrine that there can be no crime without a
criminal mind, necessarily applies to libel.139
B. Domestic Misdemeanors
Through more dicta than decisions, and by the constant re-
iteration in text books, the rule is well known that when at common
law a married woman commits a felony in her husband's presence,
a rebuttable legal presumption arises that the woman acted under the
133. Thacher, op. cit. supra note 117, at 46.
134. See note 107 supra.
135. See note 125 supra.
136. 150 Minn. 406, 185 N.W. 931 (1921).
137. Id. at 410, 185 N.W. at 933.
138. Id. at 410-11, 185 N.W. at 933.
139. 1 Bishop, op. cit. supra note 30, § 922.
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coercion of her husband.140 The rule began as one of mercy toward
women. But when the presumption in the wife's favor turned to one
against the husband, it became a rule of severity toward men.1 41
Fortunately, in the felony area there is no case which would lead to
the conclusion that an innocent husband suffered the penalty for his
guilty wife. "Presence" had to be established before the rule could
come into operation.14 2 An easy burden of rebutting the presumption
makes it clear that we cannot talk of vicarious liability under this
rule. But in the cases where the presumption of coercion had been
rebutted, it was usually found by convincing evidence that the hus-
band, in whose liability alone we are interested here, participated
with his wife in the perpetration of the felony with the acts and the
frame of mind of, at least, a common law aider and abettor.1 4
3
We may take it then, that mere knowledge, or even mere
presence, alone, does not create liability in the husband for the
felony of his wife. He must at least be a common law accessory.
The liability for a wife's felony differs in only one respect from
ordinary common law principles, %is., by the existence of a rebuttable
presumption of coercion by the husband if his presence at the scene
of the crime has been established.
Commingled with the doctrine of presumptive coercion, a rule of
vicarious liability of the husband for the domestic misdemeanors of
his wife developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This
rule has not been properly understood or ireated by any of the
modern text book writers, save Sears and Weihofen .' 4 The scholarly
literature on the topic consists of a total of two extremely short
140. 1 Bishop, op. cit. s=pra note 30, c. 24; 2 Wharton, op. cit. mtpra
note 96, §§ 92-94; 1 Burdick, op. cit. wtpra note 83, §§ 162-65; 1 Russell,
op. cit. supra note 96, at 70-72; Perkins, op. cit. supra note 20, c. 8, § 4;
Williams, op. cit. supra note 16, §§ 187-89; Clark and Marshall, op. cit. supra
note 96, §§ 73-75; Dangel, Criminal Law § 79 (1951); May, op. cit. supra
note 79, § 35; Kenny, op. cit. supra note 81, § 45; Cross and Jones, op. cit.
supra note 96, c. 4, art. 18; MacQueen, The Rights and Liabilities of Hus-
band and Wife 83-86 (4th ed. Paine 1905).
141. Commonwealth v. Hill, 145 Mass. 305, 14 N.E. 124 (1887).
142. E.g., State v. Nelson, 29 Me. 329 (1849) (receiving stolen goods);
Commonwealth v. Eagan, 103 Mass. 71 (1869) (assault and battery).
143. Rex v. Hughes 2 Lewin 229, 168 Eng. Rep. 1137 (1829) ; Davis v.
State, 15 Ohio 72 (1846) (arson) ; Goldstein v. People, 82 N.Y. 231 (1880)(receiving stolen goods) ; Bibb v. State, 94 Ala. 31 (1891) (murder). But
in United States v. Terry, 42 Fed. 317 (N.D. Cal. 1890), the presumption
was overcome and the husband, a prisoner in the dcck, was not found guilty
for his wife's offense of resisting an officer, committed in the court room.
144. May, op. cit. supra note 79, at § 39. Professor Perkins also indi-
cated his awareness of the rule in his discussion of the doctrine of coercion.
Perkins, The Doctrine of Coercion, 19 Iowa L. Rev. 507, 513-14 (1934).
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review notes,145 and a few case annotations of merely encyclopedic
nature.
1 46
As far as can be determined, in England the rule of a husband's
vicarious liability for the domestic misdemeanors of his wife was
in existence as early as 1712 and 1715. In Regina v. Williams, 4 7 it
was held that both husband and wife may be indicted for the wife's
keeping a bawdy house in the common home. Rex v. Dixon was a
similar case,148 where both husband and wife were indicted, and
coercion was not presumed. It is noteworthy that both cases involved
nuisances,149 that both were, of course, misdemeanors, and that both
offenses were of a "domestic" nature, that is, involving the family
home. To bawdy houses and common gaming houses a third cate-
gory was to be added later, viAz., tippling houses. Ever since, the
rule has stayed within these confines.-"0
The earliest known American case standing for the rule was
decided in 1847. The beginning of the development, thus, coincides
with the development of absolute criminal liability by statutory
enactment or interpretation. 52 The most recent case was decided in
1928. 15 The bulk of cases stems from the 1870's and 1880's, and
the early prohibition era following World War I.
By far the largest number of cases came from Massachusetts;
other states are represented only by occasional decisions. The fact
that there has been a complete lapse of decisions since 1928 is in-
dicative of the present unimportance of this doctrine. Since lapse
of time does not abolish rules of common law, once established,
however much of the rule discussed here must still be regarded as
law in American jurisdictions. 54
Hawkins has aptly stated the reason for the domestic misde-
meanor rule when he defined the class of offenses: "[Offenses] as
145. Notes, 31 Yale L.J. 337 (1922) ; 20 Mich. L. Rev. 547 (1922).
146. Annotations, 6 Am. Dec. 106 (1878) ; 33 Am. St. Rep. 89 (1891);
4 A.L.R. 266 (1919); 19 A.L.R. 136 (1922); 71 A.L.R. 1116 (1931).
147. Regina v. Williams at 1 Salk. 384, 91 Eng. Rep. 334 (K.B. 1712).
148. 10 Mod. 335, 88 Eng. Rep. 753 (K.B. 1715).
149. In which area, as I shall show in the next section, some form of
absolute liability developed outside the group of domestic offenses. But not
all later cases under the instant rule were concerned with what actually
amounted to nuisances.
150. The interstate transportation of a prostitute for the purpose of
placing her into a bawdy house to be established by the defendant wife was
held to be within the domestic misdemeanor rule, Dawson v. United States,
10 F.2d 106 (9th Cir. 1926); but not the abduction of a minor girl by
defendant wife, State v. Nowell, 156 N.C. 648, 72 S.E. 590 (1911).
151. State v. Bantz, 11 Mo. 27 (1847).
152. Compare Mueller, op. cit. supra note 29.
153. People v. Duchow, 331 Ill. 636, 163 N.E. 352 (1928).
154. The following does not purport to give an encyclopedic account of
the cases. The less important cases have been omitted, unless they were not
listed in one of the annotations, see note 146 mipra.
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to the government of the house, in which the wife has a principal
share; and also such [offenses] as may generally be presumed to be
managed by the intrigues of her sex." '55 Hawkins was probably
not far off with this appraisal. An equally classic and even more
poetic explanation was given by the Supreme Court of West Vir-
ginia in State v. Jones:
No one could imagine for a moment that any woman could be
coerced by her husband into keeping a house of ill fame, nor
that any pure wife, free from blame would remain at such a
house kept without her consent and connivance. This is one
instance in which man, poor man, is not wholly to blame, and
it is only the most vicious and depraved men and women that
keep, abide in and frequent such abominable institutions, the
open jaws of man's eternal destruction. While man's depravity
creates the demand for such unhallowed resorts, it is woman's
depravity that keeps up the supply. Their prostitution is equally
reprehensible and corruptible of and injurious to public morals.
... Mame cannot blame Festus, nor Festus Marne, but both are
equally guilty and should suffer punishment alike.356
This sufficiently states the sociological justification for the re-
moval of this class of offenses from the sweep of the presumptive
coercion rule. In Massachusetts, however, the words of Hawkins,
reiterated by Bishop, followed in England, and even in an early
Massachusetts case, left no impression. Without any important ex-
ception, all Massachusetts cases adhere to the mistaken belief that
in dometic misdemeanors the rule is not different from what it was
believed to be for felonies where the rule of the husband's presumed
coercion prevails. 57 A few other states followed the Massachusetts
155. 1 Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, c. 1, § 12 (6th ed. 1787).
156. 53 W. Va. 613, 616-17, 45 S.E. 916, 917 (1903).
157. Commonwealth v. Murphy, 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 510 (1854) ; Com-
monwealth v. Burk, 77 Mass. (11 Gray) 437 (1858); Commonwealth v.
Butler, 83 Mass. (1 Allen) 4 (1861) ; Commonwealth v. Feeney, 95 Mass.
(13 Allen) 560 (1866); Commonwealth v. Wool, 97 Mass. 225 (1867);
Commonwealth v. Cannon, 97 Mass. 547 (1867); Commonwealth v. Tryon,
99 Mass. 442 (1868) ; Commonwealth v. Munsey, 112 Mass. 287 (1873);
Commonwealth v. Cheney, 114 Mass. 281 (1873); Commonwealth v. Rey-
nolds, 114 Mass. 306 (1873); Commonwealth v. Roberts, 132 Mass. 267(1882) ; Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 133 Mass. 381 (1882); Commonwealth
v. Gormley, 133 Mass. 580 (1882); Commonwealth v. Flaherty, 140 Mass.
454, 5 N.E. 258 (1886) ; Commonwealth v. Hill, 115 Mass. 305, 14 N.E. 124(1887); Commonwealth v. Daley, 148 Mass. 11, 1 N.E. 579 (1888); Com-
monwealth v. Walsh, 165 Mass. 62, 42 N.E. 500 (1895) ; Commonwealth v.
Whipple, 181 Mass. 343, 63 N.E. 919 (1902) ; Commonwealth v. Helfman,
258 Mass. 410, 155 N.E. 448 (1927). All these cases ignore the recognition,
obiter, by an early Massachusetts court that domestic misdemeanors "where
the wife may be presumed the principal agent" are an exception to the pre-
sumptive coercion rule. Commonwealth v. Neal, 10 Mass. 152, 6 Am. Dec.
105, 106 (1813). Adherence to the belief is more obvious in some cases than
in others, but cases in which it is not outspoken, have been omitted from
this list.
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lead without much questioning.158 But in West Virginia,'59 Iowa,160
New Jersey,' "" Michigan, 162 Washington, 6 3 Wisconsin,1 4 the fed-
eral jurisdiction,16 5 and perhaps Missouri '66 and North Carolina,1 7
the courts did not treat the rule as an outgrowth of the doctrine of
presumptive coercion. In an old New York case the impossible was
achieved of explaining this liability on both grounds. 66
There can be little doubt but that Hawkins' explanation, which
antedates any of the Massachusetts cases, is the proper one, and
that the Massachusetts explanation is erroneous.
We are now confronted with the problem of analyzing the legal
reasoning behind the rule. The question, then, is: If the wife is the
principal perpetrator and is not presumed to act under the coercion
of her husband, and if the husband is guilty of no more than actual
or constructive knowledge; how can he be held criminally liable
with his wife, or even in lieu of his wife? And closely allied with
this is the further question: Why should the husband be made liable
at all?
After rejection of much conjecture I have come to the conclusion
that the real reason for the rule is this: It was thought to be plainly
immoral to permit a husband to go free where knowledge of the
maintenance of a criminal nuisance (whether technically so or not)
of an immoral nature in his home could be imputed to him, or, more
frequently, was even actually known to him. The judges as custodes
morum, therefore, borrowed the concept of vicarious liability from
the civil side of the law and used it on the criminal side. The only
course open for the imposition of such liability on the otherwise
nonliable husband was the application of the common law principle
158. State v. Boyle, 13 R.I. 537 (1882); State v. Shee, 13 R.I. 535(1882) ; Mulvey v. State, 43 Ala. 316, 94 Am. Dec. 684 (1869) ; Hensly v.
State, 52 Ala. 10, 1 Am. Crim. Rep. 465 (1875) ; and see King v. City of
Owensboro, 187 Ky. 21, 218 S.W. 297 (1920). The law of North Carolina
is uncertain. Compare State v. Seahorn, 166 N.C. 373, 81 S.E. 687 (1914)
zvith State v. Nowell, 156 N.C. 648, 72 S.E. 590 (1911).
159. State v. Jones, 53 W. Va. 613, 45 S.E. 916 (1903).
160. State v. Gill, 150 Iowa 210, 129 N.W. 821 (1911).
161. State v. Grossman, 95 N.J.L. 497, 112 Atl. 892 (Ct. Err. & App.
1921) (holding that although there is no presumption of coercion, the wife
may, nevertheless, establish actual coercion in her defense, as in other crimes).
162. People v. Wheeler, 142 Mich. 212, 105 N.W. 607 (1905) ; People
v. Sybisloo, 216 Mich. 1, 184 N.W. 410, 19 A.L.R. 133 (1921); People v.
Liebiotka, 216 Mich. 316, 185 N.W. 825 (1921).
163. State v. Arrigoni, 119 Wash. 358, 205 Pac. 7 (1922).
164. Haffner v. State, 176 Wis. 471, 187 N.W. 173 (1922).
165. Dawson v. United States, 10 F.2d 106 (9th Cir. 1926).
166. See State v. Keithley, 142 Mo. App. 417, 127 S.W. 406 (1910).
167. See State v. Nowell, 156 N.C. 648, 72 S.E. 590 (1911). But see
State v. Seahorn, 166 N.C. 373, 81 S.E. 687 (1914).
168. Commissioners of Excise v. Keller, 20 How. Pr. 280 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1860).
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according to which the husband, as the head of the spousal com-
munity, had the right to restrain his wife from making an illegal use
of the common home.169 According to the older authorities, a hus-
band was entitled to chastise his wife with a rod no thicker than
his thumb, to force her to obedience and lawful conduct. 70 This, of
course, was a private law theory. The husband, as the owner of all
property, including that brought in by his wife, was the only person
from whom redress for the wrong of any family member could be
obtained. Interestingly enough, in at least one case, the court looked
behind the prerogative to chastise, and based liability in domestic
misdemeanor cases directly on the "one-person" theory of mar-
riage. 27 The husband's prerogatives had largely ceased to exist
when the rule under discussion became part of the common law of
the United States. But not only had reliance on the old prerogative
of the husband's corporeal chastisement of his wife provided a con-
venient means for now extending liability to him, it was, in addition,
still a time when wives were under greater dominance of their hus-
bands than they are today. Even as late as 1921 it was believed that
such an imposition of punishment upon the husband made for
"domestic tranquility and social peace." 172 It is highly probable
that the English judges in Williams and Dixon were moved by the
same consideration, but 200 years earlier.
Without going into any further sociological or legal explanations
- which would be of purely historical interest - I should like to
summarize the domestic misdemeanor rule as follows:
(1) As a matter of practice, husband and wife are usually
joined in the indictment for the wife's domestic misdemeanor. 7 3
(2) The husband will be indicted and convicted alone where
the court excuses the wife on the ground of actual or inferred co-
169. Commonwealth v. Wood, 97 Mass. 225 (1867) ; Commonwealth v.
Barry, 115 Mass. 146 (1874); Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 119 Mass. 211(1875) ; Commonwealth v. Carrol, 124 Mass. 30 (1878) ; Commonwealth v.
Hill, 145 Mass. 305, 14 N.E. 124 (1887); Commonwealth v. Walsh, 165
Mass. 62, 42 N.E. 500 (1895) ; State v. Rozum, 8 N.D. 548; 80 N.W. 477(1899); People v. Liebiotka, 216 Mich. 316, 185 N.W. 825 (1921) ; State v.
Arrigoni, 119 Wash. 358, 205 Pac. 7 (1922). It makes no difference that the
premises on which the wife commits the offense are here separate property.
State v. Rozum, 8 N.D. 548, 80 N.W. 477 (1899) ; Commonwealth v. Pratt,
126 Mass. 462 (1879).
170. Stewart, Husband and Wife § 63 (1887).
171. King v. City of Owensboro, 187 Ky. 21, 218 S.W. 297 (1920).
But no liability in this case, as a statute was deemed to have abolished the rule.
172. People v. Sybisloo, 216 Mich. 1, 184 N.W. 410 (1921). See Note,
31 Yale L. J. 337 (1922).
173. E.g., Regina v. Williams, 1 Salk 384, 91 Eng. Rep. 334 (K.B.
1712); State v. Bentz, 11 Mo. 27 (1847); Commonwealth v. Cheney, 114
Mass. 281 (1873) ; State v. Gill, 150 Iowa 210, 129 N.W. 821 (1911).
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ercion,17 4 or, independent of this rule, where under the domestic
misdemeanor rule "vicarious liability" is understood to mean sup-
planted rather than supplemented liability.
1 75
(3) The wife will be indicted and convicted alone where she
commits the domestic misdemeanors in the absence of her hus-
band, 7 6 or where her acts are in defiance of her husband's orders. 77
(4) Both the husband and the wife will be indicted and con-
victed where the presumptive coercion is overcome by the wife's
independent acts in the proximity of her husband 78 or acts evidenc-
ing the wife's active participation with her husband, 79 or, inde-
pendent of the presumptive coercion rule, where under the domestic
misdemeanor rule vicarious liability is understood to mean supple-
mented rather than supplanted liability, 80 or where both husband
and wife are liable as principals, or principal and accessory under
ordinary common law rules.' 8 '
This, then, is the domestic misdemeanor rule. What started out
as a presumption in favor of the wife became in many cases a pre-
174. Commonwealth v. Pratt, 126 Mass. 462 (1879); Commonwealth v.
Burk, 77 Mass. (11 Gray) 437 (1858); Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 119
Mass. 211 (1875) ; Commonwealth v. Wood, 97 Mass. 225, 228 (1867), ("he
alone is held responsible for such crimes.") ; Mulvey v. State, 43 Ala. 316,
94 Am. Dec. 684 (1869). See Commonwealth v. Barry, 115 Mass. 146 (1874).
175. State v. Arrigoni, 119 Wash. 358, 205 Pac. 7, 27 A.L.R. 310
(1922); People v. Sybisloo, 216 Mich. 1, 184 N.W. 410, 19 A.L.R. 133
(1921); People v. Liebiotka, 216 Mich. 316, 185 N.W. 825 (1921). Cf.
Commissioners of Excise v. Keller, 20 How. Pr. 280 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1860).
176. As discussed. See Commonwealth v. Cheney, 114 Mass. 281, 282(1873), where the wife alone was indicted as "the head woman" of a bawdy
house. The husband was thought to be likewise guilty "if he resides with her
in the house." Commonwealth v. Feeney, 95 (13 Allen) Mass. 650 (1866).
177. Possibly with the further restriction that she commits the acts on
"her" own property, as discussed.
178. Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 133 Mass. 381 (1882).
179. Commonwealth v. Tryon, 99 Mass. 442 (1868) ; see Commonwealth
v. Gannon, 97 Mass. 547 (1867).
180. State v. Jones, 53 W. Va. 613, 45 S.E. 916 (1903); State v.
Grossmann, 95 N.J.L. 497, 112 Atl. 892 (Ct Err. & App. 1921).
11. E.g., State v. Bentz, 11 Mo. 27 (1847), where both the husband and
the wife were indicted for jointly keeping a bawdy house. This is the oldest
American case in this field of law. Reliance is placed only on the old Eng-
lish case of Regina v. Williams, supra note 147.
Commonwealth v. Tyron, 99 Mass. 442 (1868), where the husband
maintained the liquor nuisance in cooperation with his wife. Both were found
guilty as principals.
State v. Gill, 150 Iowa 210, 129 N.W. 821 (1911), where the husband
was convicted with his wife, for keeping a house of prostitution. The hus-
band was guilty as principal for keeping the house in which his wife, as
abettor, was the only prostitute.
State ex rel. Seeberger v. Tillotta, 202 Iowa 1217, 211 N.W. 721(1927) ; in this case the wife was likewise indicted and convicted for failure
to take active steps to prevent her husband from maintaining a liquor nuisance
in the common home. There was evidence that the wife had asked the hus-
band to remove the nuisance.
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sumption against the husband in the blossoming time of the rule,18 2
and, in the rule's withering days, was taken merely "for what it is
worth." 18
With a fine feeling for realities, the courts have filled a gap
and invented a rule of liability of the husband for the publicly detri-
mental domestic offenses of his wife, which the husband had a power
to prevent. The implication of the domestic misdemeanor rule is just
the opposite of that of the presumptive coercion rule. The former
is based on a superabundance of the wife's influence-in the domestic
sphere, the latter on a superabundance of the husband's influence in
the public sphere. The former means to exert pressure on the hus-
band to exercise more influence on his wife, the latter to exercise less.
The presumptive coercion rule has no more justification in the
common law, but the domestic misdemeanor rule has its place. If
abrogated, it will, unless a statute has taken its place, leave a gap in
the law. But since the domestic misdemeanor rule has been derived
from principles of private law, alien to actus reus and mens rea
requirements of the criminal law, care should be taken to limit the
rule to proper confines. Consent and sufferance, i.e., permission,
irrebuttably implied from knowledge said to arise from constructive
presence, is an anomaly which has no place in the criminal law.
My study of the law of domestic nisdemeanors has convinced
me that, on a larger scale than in the libel field, a confounding of
civil and criminal doctrine has led to a limited disregard of the
traditional common law mens rea requirement. The errors com-
mitted have been pointed out. This limited, unusual and isolated
departure from common law mens rea principles leads me to con-
clude that the ethical status of the common law of crimes, as re-
flected by mens rea, has not suffered a material repudiation.
C. Criminal Nuisance
The law of criminal nuisance is said to present a further major
example of a dispensation with mens rea requirements.18,4 The
authorities cited for the proposition are often repeated and rarely
182. Commonwealth v. Hill, 145 Mass. 305, 14 N.E. 124 (1887).
183. Commonwealth v. Helfman, 258 Mass. 410, 416, 155 N.E. 448, 450(1927).
184. Bishop, op. cit. supra note 30, § 1075; 2 Wharton, op. cit. supra
note 96, §§ 1688-90; 3 Burdick, op. cit. supra note 83, § 887; Russell, op. cit.
supra note 96, at 1674; Perkins, op. cit. supra note 20, at 829; Clark and
Marshall, op. cit. supra note 96, § 189(f) ; May, op. cit. supra note 79, at 3,
44; Williams, op. cit. supra note 16, § 77.2; Kenny, op. cit. supra note 81,
§§ 28, 447; Cross and Jones, op. cit. supra note 96, at 49, 68; Baty, Vicarious
Liability c. 10 (1916) ; Sayre, Criminal Liability for the Acts of Another,
43 Harv. L. Rev. 688 (1930).
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re-examined. It will, therefore, be necessary to subject all relevant
cases to close scrutiny.
A public nuisance is a common law misdemeanor. In the last
century and a half the scope of the law of nuisances has been en-
larged by statutory additions; the definitions of many nuisances
have been altered. But the principles applying to the interpretation
of this misdemeanor have remained as at common law. Unless, there-
fore, a statute has been interpreted as modifying the principles of
construction and liability for a particular nuisance, we must take it
as a common law nuisance, subject to common law interpretation.
In the following I shall rely on a number of cases dealing with the
principles of liability for common law nuisance stricto senmst, as well
as those added or altered by statute, but left for construction and
interpretation in accordance with common law principles. This limi-
tation results in the exclusion of virtually all nuisances in violation
of laws regulating the sale of intoxicating liquors. The liquor cases
must be treated as a separate category. They are not restricted to
nuisances, but include other violations of the liquor laws as well,
all subject to the same principles of interpretation, though not with
uniform results.18 5 For the purpose of convenience I shall again
begin with a treatment of the English law. To some extent I can here
rely on the excellent treatise by Mr. Baty, 8 6 who analyzed the cases
critically and traced the various doctrines to the predilections of the
judges who expounded them.
We should go back as far as Rex v. Watts, 87 decided at a time
when absolute liability of a publisher for the libel of his agent had
been pronounced once already, and one year prior to Lord Tenter-
den's second ruling to this effect.'8 s The Watts case involved the
liability of a ship owner for criminal nuisance in obstructing the
King's highway through the sinking of a vessel in a navigable river.
It was proved in behalf of the defendant that the sinking had been
by accident or misfortune, which was held to be a good defense.8 9
Vis maj or, undoubtedly, is the strongest possible defense (namely
excluding actus reus). Query whether any lesser defense, such as
mistake of fact (as merely excluding mens rea), would have ex-
cused for nuisance in 1798.
The issue of vicarious liability and the applicability of ordinary
185. The liquor offenses, as an aspect of absolute liability imposed by
statute, will be discussed elsewhere. For partial discussion see Mueller, op.
cit. supra note 29.
186. Baty, op. cit. supra note 184.
187. 2 Esp. 675, 170 Eng. Rep. (N.P. 1798).
188. See text at note 98, supra. See Baty, op. cit. supra note 184, at 199.
189. Compare with State v. Gould, 40 Iowa 372 (1875).
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defenses was squarely presented in Rex v. Medley. °90 Without the
defendant's orders, the employees of a gas works had directed odious
fumes into a river, thereby polluting it. The defendant officers were
held criminally liable, it being sufficient that they had given orders
to the workmen to conduct the works in general. There can be no
doubt that this principle goes back to Lord Tenterden's broad
proposition that "... a person who derives profit from, and furnishes
means for carrying on the concern, and entrusts the conduct of the
publication to one whom he selects, and in whom he confides, is
answerable, [criminally] for the acts of that agent.""'9
A second case of obstruction of the King's highway was decided
in 1836.02 Here the problem was one of direct rather than vicarious
criminal liability. Defendant had caused a causeway to be built
into a navigable stream. He was held to have been properly con-
victed for nuisance, his intent being irrelevant. Evidence of good
intention and resulting benefit to others was immaterial. We should
observe that, properly speaking, liability in this case was imposed
on actus reus alone. Defendant consciously brought about a certain
state of affairs. If he did in fact not know that his action constituted
a nuisance, then he labored under a mistake of law - more properly
a subsumption error - which, of course, does not excuse him. But
this case demonstrates anew that hardships may be caused if error
jurig nwcet is applied to offenses which are not part of the moral code.
The most famous case was decided in 1866: Regina v.
Stephen.103 Defendant was the senile owner of a slate quarry, man-
aged entirely by his sons. He was unable to visit the quarry, but
had given general instructions to operate the quarry in a proficient
and lawful manner, as he established by evidence. Acting against
these orders, the workmen dumped refuse slate into the river, there-
by establishing a nuisance in the obstruction of the highway. Mens
rea was held not to be required, the owner being absolutely liable
for any criminal act committed by workmen in his employment for
his profit. The court explained why such an absolute liability could
be imposed and, as it thought, in fact had always been imposed, by
calling the action a civil one, though criminal in form.
The sophistry in Regina v. Stephens hardly suffices to constitute
an excuse for dispensing with common law requirements of actus
reus and mens rea. If a civil action becomes criminal in form, i.e.,
190. 6 Car. & P. 292 172 Eng. Rep. 1246 (N.P. 1834).
191. Rex. v. Gutch (1829) M. & M. 432, 437, 173 Eng. Rep. 1214, 1216
(N.P. 1829), a concurring opinion, going further than that of the majority.
See libel note 111, .supra.
192. Rex. v. Ward 4 Ad. & E. 384, 111 Eng. Rep. 382 (K.B. 1836).
193. L.R. 1 Q.B. 702 (1867).
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subject to criminal sanctions, it becomes a criminal offense. Thus,
the whole concept of the civil offense is an anomaly, coined only to
explain, though not to justify, the imposition of absolute liability in
certain cases. Every crime which is also a tort, is a civil offense by
definition and criteria of gravity or heinousness of the offense can-
not be used to restrict the meaning of the term to lighter offenses.
The civil offense concept is nothing but the demonstration of an
age-old legislative wisdom: to rule by civil"94 law as long as possible,
but to make use of the criminal law with respect to particular con-
duct when the civil sanction alone is no longer effective. But when
this decision is made, we are confronted with a new crime, not a
civil offense, and the criminal law must be applied in its totality.
Regina v. Stephens was the case to go all the way in applying the
transplanted civil law rule qui facit per alium facit per se.
Blackburn, J., of fame in the development of absolute liability,
renedered the third decision on the qui facit principle in a smoke
nuisance case.195 The imposition of absolute liability on the owners
of the premises creating the nuisance was soon to be modified by
Chisholm v. Doulton,9 6 in which the judges held that a master who
had supplied his employee with proper equipment, could not be held
absolutely responsible for the smoke nuisance created by the em-
ployee through the latter's negligence. As the case was decided at
a time when more and more legislation dispensed with the mens rea
requirement, the court saw fit to rely on the statute on which the
proceeding was based, rather than on principles of common law
nuisance. Thus, the court said that the legislature may dispense with
mens rea requirements, but that the prosecution had failed to estab-
lish such a legislative intention in the instant case. Chisholm v.
Doulton, however, did not terminate absolute liability in the nui-
sance field. In Attorney-General v. Tod Heatley,97 an action for
abatement of a criminal nuisance rather than for the imposition of
a penalty, the judges again declared that mens rea and scienter of
the "responsible" person were of no significance. With this case the
era of absolute liability for a common law criminal nuisance found
its end in England. There are two reasons for this end. First,
statutory law replaced virtually all the common law of nuisance and
194. Both in the meaning of contrast to criminal, and "polite" or
"urbane".
195. Barnes v. Akroyd L.R. 7 Q.B. 474 (1872).
196. 22 Q.B.D. 736 (1889). All later smoke nuisance cases are in ac-
cord with Chisholm v. Doulton, as were those prior to that case. See Baty,
op. cit. supra note 184, at 207.
197. [1897] 1 Ch. 560. It constituted a criminal nuisance to "permit"
refuse to accumulate on a vacant lot
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regulated the questions of mens rea and imputation. Second, unless
a statute made it reasonably certain that the legislator meant to
dispense with mens rea requirements, the judges were cautious
to extend absolute liability even in the nuisance cases, possibly as
a result of the impact of Regina v. Tolson.198
American cases on the subject of criminal liability for nuisance
are sufficiently numerous to permit a classification into three groups:
(1) those believed to impose direct absolute liability, (2) those
believed to impose vicarious liability, and (3) those clearly requir-
ing some form of mens rea.
(1) In a number of cases the courts seem to have imposed
absolute liability for criminal nuisance, though in the disguise of
requiring an intent to do that which in fact amounts to a nuisance,
with the qualification that this intent need not be "evil". In other
words, conduct is required. In Troops v. State'9 9 the court stated that
"malice" was not required.20 0 In Seacord v. People, 201 the court
found it "immaterial whether the defendant intended the prejudicial
result to others or not...,"202 as long as he intended to do what in
effect amounted to the nuisance.2°s In People z. Burtleson the Utah
court found that defendant's sheep had polluted a small river; de-
fendant was found guilty of knowingly having suffered what in
effect amounted to a nuisance, intent and motive being irrelevant. 20 '
The extent of liability under this rule is indicated in a few cases
in which the defendant had acted with the advice of competent ex-
perts. Chute v. State concerned a building in danger of falling,
which was held to constitute a criminal nuisance for which the
owner was responsible ;205 the court ruled that the defendant had
been properly refused to introduce evidence that he had consulted
a competent builder about the necessity for repair of the building.
But the court did indicate that excusable ignorance - a term which
198. [1889] 23 Q.B.D. 168 Attorney General v. Todd Heatley notwith-
standing, see Baty, op. cit. supra note 184, at 211.
199. 92 Ind. 13 (1883).
200. Which is a statement not to the point. It is clear that malice is
not required. What is not clear is whether or not there must at least be a
selfish frame of mind in disregard of the rights of others in doing the act.
201. 121 Ill. 623, 13 N.E. 194 (1887) (animal carcass nuisance).
202. Id., at 631, 13 N.E. at 197; accord, Acme Fertilizer Co. v. State,
34 Ind. App. 346, 72 N.E. 1037, 107 Am. St. Rep. 190 (App. Ct. 1905).
203. See also State v. Boll, 59 Mo. 321 (1875). It was not alleged
that the defendant intended any harmful result. He was merely held crimi-
nally responsible for maintaining what in effect amounted to a nuisance.
204. 14 Utah 258, 47 Pac. 87 (1896) ; see Salt Lake City v. Young, 45
Utah 349, 145 Pac. 1047 (1915) (pollution by defendant's 27 horses) ; accord,
United States v. Fraser, 156 F. Supp. 144, 147 (D. Mont. 1957) (statute).
205. 19 Minn. 271 (1872).
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was not defined -might perhaps have been a good defense.20 6 A
similar case was State v. Gould.20 7 Defendant was found to have
obstructed a highway by building a fence over part of it, under
mistake of fact as to the proper boundary of the highway. He had
acted after consultation with the official county surveyor. The county
surveyor's error did not excuse the defendant. But the court did
not want to state a universal rule. Obiter it was said that accident
might have been an excuse. But where the factual result had been
achieved with the intention of achieving this factual result, there
could be no excuse. More specifically, on an indictment for nuisance
by obstructing the highway it is not necessary that the defendant
commit the act with "malice," nor is it necessary that he intends to
obstruct the highway, as long as he causes what amounts to an
obstruction intentionally, rather than by accident.20 9 This indicates
a willingness to dispense with mens rea but not with actus reus.
Commonwealth v2. Dicken is in accord.210 Good faith and error
of fact were no defense. A similar holding is State v. Portland.21 "
The city was held liable for a nuisance caused by a faulty sewerage
system. The fact of offensiveness of the system, i.e., the fact of
nuisance, was said to give an irrebuttable presumption of negli-
gence, which could not be overcome by the showing of care to pre-
vent the harm, nor by the fact that the nuisance was carried on
for the benefit of the community as a whole. In State v. White the
defendants were found guilty of the nuisance of wilfully and know-
ingly obstructing the public highway.2 2 Innocent acts done in good
faith would not fall under this nuisance statute, the court remarked,
but all those who participated in the acts which resulted in an
obstruction of the public highway, no matter what they thereby in-
tended to achieve, were guilty of the nuisance. But the ignorant
corporation president who did not actually participate in the offense,
was found not to be guilty. In People v. Cooper a corporate officer
who in fact had participated in the creation of the nuisance was
thought to be guilty of the offense, if the corporation itself could
be found guilty.
218
(2) A search for cases which impose strict vicarious liability
produced but two doubtful authorities. In People v. Detroit White
206. Id. at 279.
207. 40 Iowa 372 (1875).
208. Id. at 374.
209. For majority rule, contra, see note 226, infra.
210. 145 Pa. 453, 22 AtI. 1043 (1891).
211. 74 Me. 268 (1883).
212. 96 Mo. App. 34, 69 S.W. 684 (1902).
213. 200 App. Div. 413, 193 N.Y. Supp. 16 (2d Depet 1922).
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Lead Works both the corporation and its officers were fined for
creating and maintaining a nuisance by permitting the works to emit
offensive odors.2 14 It was clearly established that the corporate of-
ficers had no active part in the production of the odors. One might
venture to say that the court reached the result on the theory that
perhaps the officers could have prevented the nuisance had they
properly inspected the works from time to time, and that, therefore,
the conviction was a punishment for the officers' failure of super-
vision, rather than for the unlawful acts of their employees.
The second case is State v. Pennsylvania R. Co.215 It was es-
tablished that locomotive engineers "habitually" emitted smoke
from the funnels of their locomotives in the particular locality. From
this "habit" the court concluded that the corporation should have
been put on notice of this unlawful undertaking. The very habit,
repetition, or continuity which is necessary to make certain other-
wise lawful acts a nuisance was thought to be a fact that ought to
appraise the corporation of the habitual commission of the acts.
This is only a more sophisticated way of saying that the nuisance
should put the corporation, through its officers, on notice of the
nuisance. Having established this, the court could now conclude that
the corporation, as the principal, is liable for the nuisance of the
locomotive engineers which the corporation knowingly suffered.
Fortunately, this part of the case has the weight of dictum only, as
the court concluded: "For all that appears, the case may be ... that
the company directed its firemen to make as much smoke as
possible." 216
(3) These few doubtful authorities notwithstanding, it appears
to be the overwhelming consensus of American judicial opinion that
nuisance is a misdemeanor requiring some form of mens rea. The
definition of criminal nuisance as an omission or neglect to perform
a public duty, or as arising from an unlawful act, itself is indicative
of the form which mens rea takes in this misdemeanor. 217 The omis-
sion to perform a public duty is the violation of an ought premise,
based on at least an ought scienter. Thus, in People v. Albany the
court operated under the premise that the mayor, the aldermen and
the commonalty of the city ought to have known of the nuisance by
unwholesome stenches, produced by a sewerage system which the
214. 82 Mich. 471,46 N.W. 735, 91 L.R.A. 722 (1890).
215. 84 N.J.L. 550,87 AtI. 86 (1913).
216. Id. at 555, 87 At. at 88. This case is of some prominence in the
law of corporate officers' criminal liability, which is not to be discussed here.
See Mueller, op. cit. supra, note 31.
217. Defined in People v. Albany, 11 Wend. 539 (N.Y. 1834).
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court regarded as having been negligently constructed. 218 Those
indicted ought, then, to have taken steps to prevent the continuance
of the nuisance. The culpable failure to realize, or to become aware
of, the nuisance is the crux of mens rea in criminal nuisance. This
was best stated in People v. Borden's Condensed Milk Co., where
the court defined the necessary mens rea as a complete indifference
to the rights of others, i.e., carelessness. 2 19 Mens rea in criminal
nuisance, thus, is "independent of any positive purpose of annoy-
ance," it is merely "self concentration" and a failure to think of
anybody but himself.220 In People v. Hess the court addressed itself
to the "apparent confusion with respect to the use of the words
'criminal intent' with reference to a public nuisance." 22 ' Defendant
and his company had installed 600 cheap burglar alarm systems in
stores in New York City. By reason of deficient construction, the
alarm bells would frequently start ringing without cause, with the
same noise as that which would be caused by intruders. Defendant
had sixty private patrolmen stationed in the area in which the bells
were installed. Upon the ringing of the bell, which could be heard
in a radius of 700 feet, and which would be heard by one of the
patrolmen sooner or later, the defendant would be notified. Hours
would pass until the ringing of the bell could be stopped. The court
had no difficulty finding the defendant's mens rea in the complete
disregard of the rights of others over his own business interest.
As a matter of law, however, such an inference of criminal guilt,
or mens rea, merely rests on a presumption. In People v. Hess this
presumption was virtually irrebuttable, paralleling the res ipsa
loquitur of tort law.222 In Mergentheim v. State the facts were not
as strong.22 3 The defendant merely lived close by his property on
which the nuisance was being maintained. The presumption of his
guilt, arising out of the commission of nuisance, was nevertheless
held to be rebuttable.
How such a prima facie guilt for criminal nuisance can be re-
butted is best shown in the cases dealing with nuisance in obstruct-
ing a highway. This nuisance is today entirely statutory, but usually
declaratory of the common law. The statutes require a "wilfull"
218. Ibid.
219. 165 App. Div. 711, 151 N.Y. Supp. 547 (2d Dep't 1915). The cor-
poration's intent was the carelessness of the employees in noisomely
handling milk cans in early morning hours with complete disregard for the
well being of neighbors.
220. Id. at 714, 151 N.Y. Supp. at 549.
221. 110 Misc. 76, 80, 179 N.Y. Supp. 734, 777 (Gen. Sess. N.Y. Co.
1920).
222. See cases on direct liability, § 1), upra.
223. 107 Ind. 567, 8 N.E. 568 (1886).
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obstruction. "Wilfull" could be interpreted as referring merely to
the mental process of the act which constitutes the nuisance.22' That
would amount to an imposition of absolute liability, especially if the
nuisance arose out of lawful pursuit; was not accompanied by the
actor's carelessness; or was even the result of competent advice.
Almost universally the courts have rejected such a rule. In People
v. Eckerson the court found that the defendant's acts were in lawful
pursuit of his activity; that the nuisance was not a natural result of
these acts; and that the defendant's mind was not tinged by care-
lessness.225 In four other cases the defendants even acted on the
advice of the competent highway commissioners, or after a search
of the county records. Universally the convictions were reversed.
226
Defendants who rely for their action on official advice, thus, are
nearly certain to escape punishment for criminal nuisance. But even
in some less obvious cases, merely arising out of lawful pursuit of
business, some courts directed dismissals of the charges of criminal
nuisance. Thus, when a Texas court found that the nuisance with
which the defendant was charged was merely incidental to a lawful
activity, irrigation, it concluded that there was a total lack of((criminal intent," and ordered the case dismissed.227 In Stein v.
State the Alabama court extensively treated the question of intent in
criminal nuisance. The charge was the supply of unwholesome or
poisonous water to the city, by the licensee of the city water works.
The defendant, it found, could not be held responsible unless he
intentionally supplied what he actually knew to be poisonous or
unwholesome. Mere carelessness was not sufficient mens rea.22 8 In
Cumberland Pipe Line Co. v. Commonwealth the Kentucky court
reached the same conclusion, requiring that the defendant must be
shown to have been at least culpably negligent in the construction
and maintenance of its leaking oil pipe line.229 This restriction on the
imputation to a corporation of the acts of officers or employees,
through whom the corporation necessarily acts, applies with the
same force to other quasi-agency relationships. Thus, a landlord can-
not be held responsible for the nuisance committed by his tenant,
in the form of a house of prostitution, unless he has shown his
assent by some affirmative act.
2 0
224. As in State v. Gould, smpra note 207, the only highway case soholding.225. 133 App. Div. 220, 117 N.Y. Supp. 418 (2d Dep't 1909).
226. State v. Preston, 34 Wis. 675 (1874) ; State v. Cummerford, 16
Kan. 507 (1876) ; Parsons v. State, 26 Tex. Crim. 192, 9 S.W. 490 (1888) ;
People v. Croune, 51 Hun. 489, 4 N.Y. Supp. 266 (Sup. Ct 3rd Dep't 1889).
227. Stacey v. State, 54 Tex. Crim. 610, 114 S.W. 807 (1908).
228. 37 Ala. 123 (1861).
229. 214 Ky. 698, 283 S.W. 1039 (1926).
230. Iowa v. Abrahamns, 6 Iowa 116 (1858).
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Thus, it may be concluded that:
(a). Nuisance is a common law misdemeanor requiring mens
rea in the form of carelessness, or, according to some decisions,
culpable negligence. This implies that bona fide mistake of fact will
constitute a defense, and that persons otherwise chargeable cannot
be convicted unless they lacked scienter culpably.
(b). In England, at least according to some judges, the rule
was otherwise for several decades during the 19th century.
(c). A number of American nuisance cases seem to impose
absolute liability for direct creation of a criminal nuisance, on the
theory that the intent to do what in fact amounts to a nuisance is
sufficient mens rea. Under this rule a showing of accident, but not
a showing of mistake of fact, would constitute a defense. These
cases are based on either tort law precedent or statutory authority
where the legislator attempted to dispense with common law mens
rea requirements. On common law principles these few cases present
indefensible holdings and should not be regarded as authoritative.
D. Miscellaneous Cases
1. CONSPIRACY
In his work on Criminal Law, Glanville Williams noted that
apart from the apparent exceptions, which are among those dis-
cussed in this chapter, "[t]here does not seem to be any instance
of strict responsibility at common law, [e]xcept possibly conspiracy,
which may take its color from the illegal act that it is conspired to
commit." 231 After a brief discussion of two English cases possibly
so holding, the learned author concludes that conspiracy as" a com-
mon law misdemeanor requires mens rea." 232 In the United States
this has never been doubted. In fact, here the conspiracy to commit
a statutory misdemeanor of strict liability "not only needs mens rea
but needs knowledge of the statutory prohibition, conspiracy being
an exception to the rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse." 233
If conspiracy can at all be regarded as inconsistent with ordinary
common law principles, so only with respect to the liability for a
mens rea evidenced by an overt act which in other crimes would be
an insufficent actus reus.2 "4 This means that in the common law mis-
demeanor of conspiracy, mens rea is overemphasized (as in at-
tempts) rather than de-emphasized. Lastly, the very fact that com-
231. Williams, op. cit. supra note 16, at 238, note 2.
232. Id. at 263.
233. Ibid., and authorities cited there.
234. This has special application to conspiracies to do that which it
would be lawful to do for one person singly, under the so-called Hawkins'
Doctrine. See Sayre, The Crime of Conspiracy, 35 Harv. L. Rev. 393 (1922).
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mon law conspiracy is a misdemeanor guards against the possibility
that the departure from the original scheme by one conspirator
through commission of a graver offense will subject the other con-
spirators to a liability for an offense not encompassed by their
mens rea.
2. NON-PERFORmANCE OF NON-DELEGA3LE DuTY
Sears and Weihofen recognized that a group of cases, apparently
imposing vicarious liability, did not proceed on that theory, but
based liability on a principal for the acts of his agent under circum-
stances of duty which the courts found could not be delegated.
35
The most numerous examples under this rule are cases of homi-
cide through reckless driving. Moreland v. State is a representative
example. 238 The defendant's chauffeur drove the automobile in fla-
grant violation of several traffic law, causing the death of the driver
of another car. The defendant owner was a passenger in the car.
Ownership and presence were held to be constructive knowledge of
the violation of the law. Based on this scienter the court could pro-
ceed to hold the defendant guilty for his failure to properly restrain
his driver, who had escaped after the accident. In this case the
facts from which the court concluded on a guilty conscience in the
principal were particularly strong. Rebuttal of the imputation of
scienter was impossible. In less flagrant cases, however, the courts
have made it clear that the presumption of scienter, and with it the
inference of guilt, is a rebuttable one. So in Commonwealth v. Sher-
mn,07 where the court spoke of a prima facie presumption that the
owner of the automobile, who was present, directed its operation in
the manner which caused the death. In that case the court found
that, in addition, the defendant owner actually "participated in the
vehicle being run...." 238 He was held liable on ordinary common
law grounds as an accessory. A similar holding was Rex v. Baldes-
sare.230 There the court found that all persons in the car were joy
riders with a "community of purpose and action," and were all
equally guilty.
In some states similar holdings are based on statutes which
regulate questions of imputation and liability. Ex parte Liotard was
a case decided on such a statute.240 The court found that the legis-
235. May, op. cit. supra note 79, at 46.
236. 164 Ga. 467, 139 S.E. 77 (1927).
237. 191 Mass. 439, 78 N.E. 98 (1906).
238. Id. at 440, 78 N.E. at 99.
239. 222 Cr. App. Rep. 70, 144 L.T. 185, 29 Cox. 193, 22 C.A.R. 70(1930).
240. The cases under this topic are collected and annotated at 99 A.L.R.
756, 771-72 (1935).
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lature had made criminal intent no element of the crime, but it is
clear that mens rea in the form of carelessness was required. Care-
lessness in fact is the basis of liability in all cases of this nature,
though in a few instances the courts could actually hold the de-
fendant owner liable as a principal or accessory.
The term "non-performance of a non-delegable duty" itself was
coined by Judge Cardozo in People ex rel Price v. Sheffield Farms-
Slawson-Decker Co. 241 In that case the defendant was held crimi-
nally liable for a violation of the child labor law, for his failure to
discover that one of his agents had employed a minor. Defendant
had simply violated his statutory duty of reasonable supervision. Not
respondeat superior, but his own carelessness prompted his liability.
Again, we can hardly speak of strict, or even absolute liability in
this case.
Cases involving minors appear to be the only other group of
cases falling under the "unlawful delegation" rule. In DeZarn v.
Commonwealth the defendant pool room owner had "completely
delegated" his duty of lawful operation of the enterprise to one of
his employees, whom he knew to violate the law with respect to the
exclusion of minors! 242 The defendant did not have knowledge of
the minority of the witness for the prosecution. But for reasons of
the general knowledge of violation of the law by his agent, the
owner was held responsible. Sears and Weihofen questioned the
outcome of this case, but, again, if carelessness is one of the forms
of common law mens rea - and we know that it is - the case seems
sound on principle. In these cases it is clear that liability is not im-
posed on the legally (and morally!) innocent party, as is shown by,
for example, Justice v. Commonwealth.24 3 There the defendant pool
room owner was held to have had a good defense when he relied
on a forged letter of parental consent -one of the statutory ex-
ceptions - despite the absolute legal voidness of forged instruments.
As in the automobile-homicide cases, in many jurisdictions statutes
now regulate the extent of liability in this class of cases.2 44
3. Agent Acting Under Direction of Principal
Occasionally a court will ornament its opinion with a statement
to the effect that a "principal is liable for the illegal acts of his
241. 225 N.Y. 25, 121 N.E. 474 (1918).
242. 195 Ky. 686, 243 S.W. 921 (1922).
243. 213 Ky. 617,281 S.W. 803 (1926).
244. The cases involving pool room regulations and liability of owners
and operators for statutory violations are collected at 29 A.L.R. 41 (1924)
and 53 A.L.R. 149 (1928).
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agent done under his direction," as did the New Jersey Court in
State v. Lisena.245 Such statements must be viewed with great
caution. Subject to what has been noted in the previous sections,
criminal courts mean by "direction" actual command or super-
vision of the unlawful activity. Only civil courts impose liability on
the principal for acts done by the agent in the general scope of the
business, and in that respect under the principal's "direction." This
is borne out by the Lisena case which was decided under the New
Jersey law pertaining to receiving stolen prcperty.24 The statement
of the court in that case, coupled with the liberal reliance on cir-
cumstantial evidence, might lead a superficial observer to the con-
clusion that the court imposed vicarious, i.e., strict, liability. Such is
not the case. The law does operate freely with presumptions and has
shifted the burden of going forward.2 47 But mens rea as well as
participation are essential to conviction. Thus, the knowledge that
the goods have been stolen must be proven.2'
S
In England the rule of liability is similar. Attorney General v.
Siddon240 stands for the proposition that the finding of smuggled
goods on the master's premises, but in the servant's control, is prima
facie evidence of the master's guilt, although the case is unfortu-
nately much better known for the proposition, superficially con-
ceived, that the master is liable for the wrongful act of his servant
committed in the master's absence, but in the scope of his employ-
ment.
In these cases the principal or master could not exculpate him-
self, but this is no indication of an insurmountable onus of rebut-
tal, and consequent strict liability. The law is well settled that
criminal liability does not attach to the master whose servant com-
mits an unlawful act entirely on his own, and without the master's
knowledge. "Scope of employment" may make for liability in tort
law, but it does not do so in criminal law.
2 50
245. 129 N.J.L. 569, 572, 30 A.2d 593, 595 (1943).
246. Ibid.
247. See Note, 6 Rutgers L. Rev. 307 (1952).
248. State v. Vigorito, 1 N.J. Super. 151, 62 A.2d 823 (1948) ; State
v. Jusiak, 16 N.J. Super. 177, 84 A.2d 485 (1951) ; see Tyree, Evidence, 4
Rutgers L. Rev. 252, 259 (1950).
249. 1 Cromp. & J. 220, 148 Eng. Rep. 1400 (K.B. 1830).
250. E.g., Nall v. State, 34 Ala. 262 (1859) (sheriff was held not to be
criminally liable for the escape of a prisoner, negligently caused by a jailer
who, against the sheriff's orders, had disobeyed the deputy's instruction);
State v. Bacon, 40 Vt. 456 (1868) (experienced employee drove a horse cart
with coal on the side walk, for more convenient delivery of the coal, without
the employer's knowledge or consent, the employer was held not liable). This
rule has never been altered.
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4. Criminal Omissions
The principle that criminalty may be occasioned by omission as
well as action is too well known to require any citation of au-
thority.25 ' Nor are the mens rea requirements for omissions any
different from those for acts, although in the larger number of
crimes or misdemeanors by omission the mens rea required is ade-
quate rather than commensurate, as I have defined these terms.
Thus, in omissions we are more likely to encounter negligence,
recklessness and carelessness, particularly the latter.
An occasional case may come up in which the court is not overly
explicit about the necessary mens rea. This can lead to the sup-
position that the court imposes strict liability, usually of vicarious
nature. Such cases are rare, though easily recognizable. No attempt
to collect them shall be made here, and one demonstrative example
may suffice to put the reader on guard. In Britain v. State a master
was convicted for indecent exposure, committed by one of his
slaves.25 2 On closer analysis it will be found that the court convicted
the defendant for his utter disregard of the slave's well being, his
carelessness, or his neglect to provide the slave with decent clothing,
forcing the slave to walk about in torn rags which did not cover
the body in a lawful and decent manner. The act of lewdness was
that of the master, who exposed the slave to the public in an in-
decent manner. His mens rea was that of carelessness. The slave
cannot be said to have had any intent to indecently expose herself,
and even if one would attempt to infer her attempt from the fact that
she was indecently exposed, the facts were clear enough to invoke
necessity as an exculpatory ground in her behalf.
Examination of other alleged instances of absolute criminal lia-
bility at common law: (a) reveals that in conspiracy the common
law overemphasizes, rather than de-emphasizes, mens rea; (b)
makes it clear that a group of cases of so-called "non-performance of
non-delegable duty" and "agents acting under the direction of their
principals" are nothing but instances of vicarious liability in its
reasonable form, i.e., supplemented liability of a principal for the
unlawful act of his agent, committed because of lacking supervision
and restraint on the part of the principal. These offenses operate with
mens rea, of the adequate form, in a realistic manner and do not
constitute departures from the mens rea doctrine; (c) with respect
to crimes of omission, shows that these are subject to the same
general mens rea requirements as crimes of commision. Statutes
251. And see Part I, text at note 17, supra.
252. 3 Humph. 203 (Tenn. 1842).
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frequently call for an adequate, rather than commensurate, form
of mens rea.
III. GENERAL CONCLUSMON
Common law mens rea is not the mere psychic relation between
act and actor, it is, rather, the ethico-legal negative value of the
deed. More specifically, it is a community value, evidenced by law,
of which the perpetrator at the time of the deed knows the existence
and that it will materialize when the deed becomes known, or else,
which the perpetrator fails to appreciate despite the capacity and
opportunity to do so. In short, it is the individual blameworthiness
in a legally relevant and specified form. Contrary to general belief
there are no common law offenses in which mens rea is not required,
notwithstanding an insignificantly small number of badly reasoned
cases to the contrary. Ergo: The imposition of criminal liability,
blame, for individual blameworthiness only, proves the ethico-legal
nature of the mens rea concept at common law and, consequently,
one of the ethical foundations of the common law of crimes.
Lambert v. California: THE MoRAL DECISION 258
However much we may clamor and demand that advocates and
judges should be mindful of the total legal and extra-legal context
of each controversy, it is not their province -to reflect the totality of
human recognition in every individual case. Were it otherwise,
counsel and amicus curiae for Mrs. Lambert might have made a
vigorous argument, perhaps on constitutional grounds, against the
attorney general's -and commonly accepted- interpretation of
the California act-and-intent statute, very much as this has been
attempted in this paper. Such an argument probably would have
been futile in court. And so we find not a single word in specific reply
to the attorney general's argument on this point. Instead, the chances
of attacking the trial court's decision on the moral issue solely -
disregarding historical-technical subtleties and meta-legal recog-
nitions - appeared much more promising. But again, no attempt
was made to attack on a broad policy front. However much Lam-
bert's attorneys may be in agreement with the moral proposition
that any absolute criminal liability is immoral - and in that sense
inconsonant with due process - their arguments were concerned
solely with:
(a). an ordinance passed for the purpose of regulation, though
253. I am purposefully alluding to the title of Professor Cahn's widely
acclaimed book Cahn, The Moral Decision (1955), the leitmotiv of which
may well have guided Mr. Justice Douglas in the Lambert case.
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outside the sphere of the group of typical public welfare
offenses,2
54
(b). which provided for no sufficient means of notifying persons
concerned;
(c). which attempts to induce a certain act, rather than for-
bearance;
(d). regulating conduct which is not generally known to the
general public or specifically affected persons to be subject
to regulation, and
(e). a defendant completely ignorant of the regulation,
(f). not under any express or implied duty to know of the regu-
lation and
(g). not having a chance to rectify her existing violation of the
law upon first notice thereof.
2 2 5
Reasonable men may differ about the propriety of absolute lia-
bility in the area of conduct regulation where everybody concerned
knows of legislative intervention. But in a case like Lambert v.
Catifornia there could be little disagreement. The moral issue was
clear: this conviction does not accord with notions of morals, what-
ever we may wish to call these notions, e.g., due process, fair play
and substantial justice, etc. The issue of utility was equally clear: no
good could come from punishing a defendant under those circum-
stances. To the contrary, general frustration and disrespect for the
law might result if substantial criminality were to rest on substantial
innocence. This, it was argued on Lambert's behalf, is a case of
substantial criminality, and true criminality requires proof of aware-
ness of wrongfulness.2 "
Mr. Justice Douglas, for the majority, seized upon the issue of
the inherently moral implications of criminal guilt, as demonstrated
by the needs of this case. Referring to the traditional requirement
of notice in cases of penalties and forfeitures, he remarked: "the
principle is equally appropriate where a person, wholly passive and
unaware of any wrongdoing, is brought to the bar of justice for
condemnation in a criminal case." 257 And he concluded: "Where a
254. Broadly defined by Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 Colum. L.
Rev. 55 (1933). Amicus curiae went as far as to concede, for the sake of the
argument, that absolute criminal liability may well have a place in that type
of offense. Brief of Amicus Curiae for Appellant, p. 18, Lambert v. California,
supra note 2.
255. Impressions culled from Brief of Amicus Curiae for Appellant,
pp. 8-20, Lambert v. California, supra note 2. Aspects of arguments not
passed on by the court, e.g., unreasonableness of the ordinance, are not to be
considered in this essay.
256. Id. at 19, citing Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 279-322
(1947) ; Allen, Book Review, 66 Yale L.J. 1120 (1957) ; Mueller, Mens Rea
and the Law Without It, 58 W. Va. L. Rev. 34 (1955).
257. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957).
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person did not know of the duty... and where there was no proof
of the probability of such knowledge, he may not be convicted con-
sistently with due process."
258
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent, joined by Mr. justice Harlan
and Mr. Justice Whittaker, is a terse statement of allegiance to the
police power device of absolute criminal liability, concluding confi-
dently that "the present decision will turn out to be an isolated devi-
ation from the strong current of precedents - a derelict on the
waters of the law." 259
That the dissenters completely failed to appreciate the moral
issue of mens rea and the enormous advance toward ethicization of
our penal law which the decision constitutes, becomes most ap-
parent in this statement from the dissenting opinion: "If the gen-
eralization that underlies, and alone can justify, this decision were
to be given its relevant scope, a whole volume of the United States
Reports would be required to document in detail the legislation in
this country that would fall or be impaired." -0 If it were necessary
to perform such an Augean task in order to cleanse our penal law,
it should be an enjoyable task, and those of us who ex cathedra
have long advocated a return to the ethico-legal mens rea concept
should gladly volunteer. But this is not necessary because the num-
ber of statutes which expressly and directly, or by express rules of
general construction, require the imposition of absolute criminal
liability, is comparatively small. If courts were fully aware of the
nature and mandate of common law mens rea, especially as dis-
tinguished from the mental ingredient in conduct, the issue would
resolve itself.
The California act-and-intent statute is but a codification of the
common law mens rea requirement. But neither it nor the common
law mens rea have been properly understood. Once it is recognized
that the common law created the doctrine of mens rea as a pro-
tection against unjust conviction of the blameless and that the com-
mon law regards mens rea as a universal requirement, technical and
jurisprudential difficulties are at an end. In terms of due process
this recognition simply means: that judges no longer confound in-
tent and mens rea; that judges apply the common law rule accord-
ing to which mens rea is a universal requirement, whether or not
the statutory definition contains words indicative of mens rea, such
as "intentionally"; that act-and-intent statutes are codifications of
258. Id. at 229-30.
259. Id. at 230. Mr. justice Burton dissented because he believed that,
as applied to this appellant, the ordinance does not violate constitutional rights.
260. Id., at 232.
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the common law requisite of mens rea and should be treated as
such; and that statutes attempting to abolish a universal mens rea
requirement - and these are rather rare - are unconstitutional, as
are judicial utterances, in the nature of judicial legislation, to that
effect.
Lambert v. California did not and could not lay down such
broad, yet definite, requirements. But it unmistakably points the
way in the right direction and will ultimately lead to a complete
moral recovery of our penal law. Mr. Justice Douglas' decision is
not a sweeping condemnation of all absolute criminal liability, but
a carefully limited ban covering all offenses of omission in which,
by the nature of the definitional elements, the defendant was not,
and could not be, aware of any wrong-doing. 281 Presumptively this
leaves unaffected all offenses of commission in which, as Mr. Justice
Douglas perhaps asumed, those subject to the conduct regulation
always are appraised of the possibility of legislative regulation and
therefore should keep posted. It also excludes offenses of omission
in which, conceivably, the defendant belongs to a class of persons
which traditionally has been subjected to regulation. In other words,
by implication an arbitrary group of offenses has been left to pos-
sible absolute liability. All these unaffected offenses have in common
that presumptively the offender could not have been excusably
ignorant of wrongdoing. But this leaves us on svampy ground. Un-
questionably the distinction between active and passive conduct has
something to commend itself, though it is not necessarily true that
the likelihood of unawareness of wrongfulness is smaller in cases
of active conduct. Both error and ignorance of fact and the regulation
must be considered. Thus, a distinction should be made between
excusable and unexcusable (subject to further precisation) un-
awareness of wrongfulness, but not between active and omissive
offenses. These are questions of the future to which careful thought
must be given before sensible results can be achieved. For the
present, the really important and encouraging matter is that the
Supreme Court has clearly told us that it detests the immoral use
or misuse of the criminal sanction in the case of a morally blameless
defendant. The Court has reaffirmed the proposition, long forgotten
by many, that mens rea is an ethico-legal concept. Absolute criminal
liability is beginning to end in America.
261. Such a sweeping statement, with the weight of dictum only, might
have created the greatest difficulties at this point, possibly opening the door
to all kinds of spurious defenses.
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